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EN-GENDERING ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
MICHELE E. GILMAN*
Abstract
We live in an era of growing economic inequality. Luminaries ranging from the President
to the Pope to economist Thomas Piketty in his bestselling book Capital in the TwentyFirst Century have raised alarms about the disparity between the haves and the have-nots.
Overlooked, however, in these important discussions is the reality that economic inequality
is not a uniform experience; rather, its effects fall more harshly on women and minorities.
With regard to gender, American women have higher rates of poverty and get paid less
than comparable men, and their workplace participation rates are falling. Yet economic
inequality is neither inevitable nor intractable. Given that the government creates the rules
of the market, it is essential to analyze the government’s role in perpetuating economic
inequality.
This Article specifically examines the role of the Supreme Court in contributing to genderbased economic inequality. The thesis is that the Supreme Court applies oversimplified
economic assumptions about the market in its decision-making, thereby perpetuating
economic inequality on the basis of gender. Applying insights of feminist economic theory,
the Article analyzes recent Supreme Court jurisprudence about women workers, including
Wal-Mart v. Dukes (denying class certification to female employees who were paid and
promoted less than men), Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (granting business owners
the right to deny contraception coverage to female employees on religious grounds), and
Harris v. Quinn (limiting the ability of home health care workers to unionize and thereby
improve their working conditions). In these cases, the Court elevates its narrow view of
efficiency over more comprehensive understandings, devalues care work, upholds harmful
power imbalances, and ignores the intersectional reality of the lives of low-wage women
workers. The Article concludes that the Court is eroding collective efforts by women to
improve their working conditions and economic standing. It suggests advocacy strategies
for reforming law to obtain economic justice for women and their families.
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INTRODUCTION
President Obama calls economic inequality the “defining challenge of our time.”1 Pope
Francis decries “trickle-down theories which assume that economic growth, encouraged by
a free market, will inevitably succeed in bringing about greater justice and inclusiveness
in the world.”2 Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen asks whether growing economic
inequality “is compatible with values rooted in our nation’s history, among them the high
value Americans have traditionally placed on equality of opportunity.”3 Corporate America
is also sounding the alarm, concerned that falling incomes will hurt profits and hinder
economic growth.4 In short, economic inequality is firmly on the public agenda, as experts,
policymakers, and presidential candidates debate its causes, consequences, and cures.
Less attention is focused on the reality that not all groups experience inequality similarly.
To the contrary, economic inequality falls most harshly on minorities and women.5 The
* Venable Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. Director, Civil Advocacy Clinic; CoDirector, Center on Applied Feminism. B.A., Duke University; J.D., University of Michigan Law School.
Thanks to participants at the AALS Workshop on Next Generation Issues on Sex, Gender, and the Law, as
well as at the Workshop on Vulnerability at the Intersection of the Changing Firm and the Changing Family at
Emory Law School for their insights. I am also grateful for comments from Dan Hatcher, Margaret Johnson,
and Barbara White.
1 President Barack Obama, Remarks on Economic Inequality at the White House (Dec. 4, 2014) (transcript
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/04/remarks-president-economic-mobility
[https://perma.cc/M7QY-D4ML]).
2 Zachary A. Goldfarb & Michelle Boorstein, Pope Francis Denounces “Trickle-Down” Economic Theories
in Sharp Criticism of Inequality, Wash. Post, Nov. 26, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/pope-francis-denounces-trickle-down-economic-theories-in-critique-of-inequality/2013/11/26/
e17ffe4e-56b6-11e3-8304-caf30787c0a9_story.html [https://perma.cc/83PJ-R54Y].
3 Pedro Nicolaci Da Costa, Janet Yellen Decries Widening Income Inequality, Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 2014,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/feds-yellen-says-extreme-inequality-could-be-un-american-1413549684 [https://
perma.cc/XBB6-EARX].
4
See Business Leaders Worry About Income Inequality And Revolution, Forbes (Sept. 9,
2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/eriksherman/2014/09/09/business-leaders-worry-aboutincome-inequality-and-revolution/
[https://perma.cc/5DY6-UAXP];
How
Increasing
Income
Inequality is Dampening U.S. Economic Growth, and Possible Ways to Change the Tide,
Standard & Poor’s Global Credit Portal (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.globalcreditportal.
com/ratingsdirect/renderArticle.do?articleId=1351366&SctArtId=255732&from=CM&nsl_
code=LIME&sourceObjectId=8741033&sourceRevId=1&fee_ind=N&exp_date=20240804-19:41:13;%20
http://time.com/3083100/income-inequality/ [https://perma.cc/X7SF-7C29].
5 On the racial wealth and income gap, see Rakesh Kochhar & Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality has Widened
Along Racial, Ethnic Lines Since End of Great Recession, Pew Res. Ctr. (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.
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intersection of economic inequality with gender, as shaped and reinforced by law, is the
focus of this Article.
Currently, the top 1% of households earns one-fifth of the nation’s income.6 Wealth
inequality is even greater, as the top 1% of the distribution owns approximately 42% of the
nation’s wealth.7 Meanwhile, a majority of Americans face stagnant wages, reduced social
mobility, and higher job insecurity.8 The middle class is shrinking,9 while at the bottom of
the economic barrel, nearly 15% of the population lives below the poverty line,10 where
they struggle to meet basic needs such as food and housing.11 Economic inequality causes
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-recession/
[https://perma.cc/NWJ5-8V84];
Thomas Shapiro, Tatjana Meschede & Sam Osoro, The Roots of the Widening Racial Wealth Gap: Explaining
the Black-White Economic Divide, Inst. on Assets & Soc. Pol’y (Feb. 2013), http://iasp.brandeis.edu/pdfs/
Author/shapiro-thomas-m/racialwealthgapbrief.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MB8-D9PK]. On gender and economic
inequality, see Part I.B. infra.
6

See Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century 296 (2014).

7 See Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: Evidence
from Capitalized Income Tax Data (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20645, 2014). The
richest 0.1% holds 22% of the wealth; this group has driven the growth of wealth inequality. Id. at 22. For an
explanation of the data, trends, and measurement of economic inequality, see Chad Stone et al., A Guide to
Statistics on Historical Trends in Income Inequality, Ctr. on Budget Pol’y & Priorities (Feb. 20, 2015),
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/11-28-11pov.pdf [https://perma.cc/DY7X-4LS9].
8 See Ctr. for Am. Progress, Report of the Commission on Inclusive Prosperity 10 (Jan. 2015)
(workers face stagnant wages despite corporate growth); Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Winner-TakeAll Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class 2,
4 (2011).
9 See Keith Miller & David Madland, As Income Inequality Rises, America’s Middle Class Shrinks, Ctr. for
Am. Progress (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2014/12/18/101790/
as-income-inequality-rises-americas-middle-class-shrinks/ [https://perma.cc/7SJB-BF9N] (“As income
inequality has steadily grown in the United States, the actual size of America’s middle class has shrunk.”); 17
Things We Learned About Income Inequality in 2014, Atlantic (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/
business/archive/2014/12/17-things-we-learned-about-income-inequality-in-2014/383917/?single_page=true
[https://perma.cc/27MT-M7N7] (“More of the middle class is migrating to the lower class due to stagnant
incomes and the increased cost of living . . . ”).
10 Carmen DeNavas-Walt & Bernadette D. Proctor, U.S. Census Bureau, Income and Poverty in the
United States: 2013 12 (2014).
11 One study found that even under a conservative measure, 1.17 million children are in families living in
extreme poverty, meaning they earn less than $2.00 a day. H. Luke Shaefer & Kathryn Edin, The Rise of Extreme
Poverty in the United States, Pathways 28, 29 (Summer 2014), http://web.stanford.edu/group/scspi/_media/
pdf/pathways/summer_2014/Pathways_Summer_2014_SShaeferEdi.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MY5-PCR8].

Columbia Journal of Gender and Law

4

32.1

not only individual financial struggles, but it also harms the economy through “lower
productivity, lower efficiency, lower growth, [and] more instability.”12 By contrast, nations
with greater economic equality have more economic growth.13 Our growing economic
divergence is also linked to social dysfunctions, ranging from high rates of infant mortality,
to crime, and substance abuse; educational failures; and lower life expectancy—all of
which impose their own costs.14
Gender both generates economic inequality and magnifies its effects. For instance,
women’s workplace participation is falling, thereby impacting family incomes.15 Women
get paid less than men for the same work.16 Women are disproportionately poor and more
likely to work in low-wage jobs with few benefits or employee protections.17 These trends
are drags on the economy and limit household wealth and opportunities. However, this
lamentable state of affairs is neither inevitable, nor impossible to reverse.
An important insight in understanding economic inequality is that it is rooted in market
trends that arise within the context of state action and inaction.18 As Nobel Prize winning
economist Joseph Stiglitz explains, inequality is not solely the result of market forces;
rather, “government policies have been central to the creation of inequality in the United
States.”19 For instance, the government establishes the playing field regarding unionization,
12 Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society Endangers Our Future
117 (2012). See also Michele Gilman, A Court for the One Percent: How the Supreme Court Contributes to
Economic Inequality, 2014 Utah L. Rev. 389, 398–401 (2014) (on the effects of economic inequality).
13 Ctr for Am. Progress, supra note 8, at 45 (noting that research by the International Monetary Fund
shows that “higher levels of net income inequality . . . are negatively correlated with growth in gross domestic
product per person”).
14 Kate Pickett & Richard Wilkinson, The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies
Stronger 70, 81, 108–13, 134–37 (2009); see also Ctr. for Am. Progress, supra note 8, at 47–49 (discussing
shorter life expectancies resulting from economic inequality).
15

See infra Part I.B.

16

Id.

17

Id.

18 Government in/action is intertwined with all the major contributors to economic inequality, including
increased globalization and outsourcing of jobs, Ctr. for Am. Progress, supra note 8, at 11; technological
advances that have replaced traditional middle-income jobs, id. at 11; a rise in part-time work with few benefits,
id. at 11; the decline of unionization, id. at 12, 34; a less progressive tax system, id. at 37; and the rise of supersalaries for super-managers that bear no relation to increased productivity, id. at 12, 35–36.
19

Stiglitz, supra note 12, at 6.
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corporate governance, and competition laws, all of which relate to economic inequality.20
Political scientists Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson similarly elucidate, “[g]overnment rules
make the market, and they powerfully shape how, and in whose interests, it operates.”21
As legal scholar Martha McCluskey notes, government’s role in economic inequality is an
observation with a “long and articulate history,” but one that is muted by economic rhetoric
that treats the market and state as separable.22
Current public policies favor the top 1% at the expense of the 99%. Wealthy and
corporate interests have an outsized role in shaping the public agenda, due to the role of
money in political campaigns and lobbying.23 Substantial evidence shows that Congress
is responsive to the concerns of wealthy Americans, while dismissing those of the bottom
90%.24 The Supreme Court has solidified these political trends in decisions such as Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission.25
Less noticed, but equally problematic, the Supreme Court also contributes to genderbased economic inequality.26 Thus, this Article examines the Supreme Court’s recent

20

Id. at 57–58.

21 Hacker & Pierson, supra note 8, at 44; see also David Brady, Rich Democracies, Poor People: How
Politics Explain Poverty 6 (2009) (a sociologist explains that “the distribution of resources in states and
markets is inherently political”); Martin Gilens, Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and
Political Power in America 251–52 (2014).
22 Martha T. McCluskey, Deconstructing the State-Market Divide: The Rhetoric of Regulation from Workers’
Compensation to the World Trade Organization, in Feminism Confronts Homo Economicus: Gender, Law,
& Society 147, 148 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Terence Doughtery eds., 2005).
23 See Gilman, supra note 12, at 400–01, 434–35 (summarizing research on influence of money in politics);
Gilens, supra note 21, at 239–47 (Gilens states that “the role of money in politics is complex,” but clearly a
factor in shaping policy and electoral outcomes).
24 See Larry M. Bartels, Unequal Democracy 5, 254–65 (2004); Gilens, supra note 21, at 70, 77–85.
See also Yasmin Dawood, The New Inequality: Constitutional Democracy and the Problem of Wealth, 67 Md.
L. Rev. 123, 125 (2007) (explaining how economic inequality was a factor in constitutional design).
25 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that political spending is a form
of political speech under the First Amendment and therefore the government may not restrict corporate or union
spending on “electioneering communications” to support or oppose individual candidates in elections). See also
Gilman, supra note 12, at 437–41 (discussing connection between Citizens United and economic inequality).
26 For a discussion of how the Supreme Court has reinforced economic inequality in the areas of education,
redistribution, corporate law, and the political process, see Gilman, supra note 12.
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doctrine where gender and class intersect.27 It imports core insights from feminist economic
theory into legal analysis to help understand the harm to women wrought by the mainstream,
neoclassical economic models based on efficiency and individual self-interest to which the
Court majority adheres. The thesis is that the Supreme Court either overtly or implicitly
applies neoclassical economic assumptions in its decision-making, thereby perpetuating
economic inequality on the basis of gender.
Part I describes the current patterns of income and wealth inequality and explains
how gender interplays with these trends. It also sets forth basic principles of feminist
economic theory, which reveal how the market and assumptions about the market shape
inequitable outcomes. In Parts II to IV, the Article focuses on three recent Supreme Court
cases that limit the rights of women in the low-wage workforce. Each case bears out the
observations of feminist economists. These cases are significant not only due to the sheer
numbers of women workers impacted, but also because the workplace dynamics exemplify
the chasm between the economic fortunes of the top 1% and everyone else. In Wal-Mart
v. Dukes28 (discussed in Part II), the Court made it difficult, if not impossible, to challenge
discriminatory pay and promotion policies that arise from discretionary personnel policies,
which dominate the modern workplace. In Harris v. Quinn29 (discussed in Part III), the
Court limited the ability of home health care workers to unionize and thereby improve
their working conditions. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.30 (discussed in Part IV),
the Court granted business owners the right to deny contraception coverage to female
employees on religious grounds. Reflecting on these cases, this Article concludes that
the Court overturns or interprets legislation designed to correct for market imperfections
in favor of corporate preferences.31 In so doing, the Court fails to acknowledge its own
hand in fostering economic and gender inequality. At the same time, the Court reinforces
gender-based stereotypes about women workers that have long limited their economic
opportunity. The Court’s benign view of the market and its biased view of women create a
potent combination that results in further entrenchment of economic inequality for women.
27 Laura T. Kessler, Getting Class, 56 Buff. L. Rev. 915 (2008) (Kessler discusses the inattention of feminist
legal theory to class: “By placing economically privileged, white, heterosexual women at the center of the
analysis, such theories and strategies discount the experiences of many women and men.”).
28

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).

29

Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).

30

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).

31 See Martha T. McCluskey, Razing the Citizen: Economic Inequality, Gender, and Marriage Tax Reform,
in Gender Equality: Dimensions of Women’s Equal Citizenship 267 (Linda C. McClain & Joanne L.
Grossman eds., 2012).
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I. Economic Inequality and Gender
A. The Rise of Economic Inequality
The data on economic inequality is sobering and irrefutable. We currently have greater
economic inequality than the Roaring Twenties, when income was concentrated in the
hands of wealthy industrialists.32 After World War II, the nation enjoyed several decades of
shared growth with stable income distributions, resulting from government policies such
as the GI bill, which sent veterans to college, a progressive tax system, and a strong labor
movement.33 However, since the late 1970s, the top 1% has been pulling away from the
rest of the country.34 Thirty years ago, the top 1% earned 12% of the nation’s income; today
their share is 21%.35 Wealth inequality is even starker, as a household in the top 1% holds
225 times the wealth of the average American household.36
If the pie were growing for all Americans, this divergence might not be a concern.
However, the bottom 90% is working harder with less to show for it.37 Wages have been
stagnant for the bottom 70% of income earners since the 1970s.38 Meanwhile, the largest
share of the nation’s economic growth has gone to the top 1%.39 While the wages of the top
32 Benjamin I. Page & Lawrence R. Jacobs, Class War? 7 (2009); see also Frank Levy & Peter Temin,
Inequality and Institutions in 20th Century America 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
13106, 2007), http://www.nber.org/papers/w13106 [https://perma.cc/7TRY-LQ6W] (describing the increase in
income inequality from 1980 to 2005); Stone et al., supra note 7, at 11.
33 See Piketty, supra note 6, at 294; Stiglitz, supra note 12, at 11; Bartels, supra note 24, at 8–9; Levy
& Temin, supra note 32, at 2 (holding that between 1980 and 2005, business sector productivity increased by
67.4%, yet median weekly earnings of full-time workers rose only 14%).
34

See Stiglitz, supra note 12, at 11.

35

Id. at 11; Page & Jacobs, supra note 32, at 7.

36

See Stiglitz, supra note 12, at 2.

37

See Timothy Noah, The Great Divergence 176 (2012); Bartels, supra note 24, at 17–18.

38 Lawrence Mishel, Causes of Wage Stagnation, Econ. Pol’y Inst. 1 (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.epi.org/
publication/causes-of-wage-stagnation/ [https://perma.cc/9AY7-KD8X].
39 See Ctr. for Am. Progress, supra note 8, at 104 (95% of post-recession income gains went to the
top 1% of households). The causes of wage stagnation result from intentional policy choices including, “the
abandonment of full employment as a main objective of economic policymaking, declining union density,
various labor market policies and business practices, policies that have allowed CEOs and finance executives
to capture ever larger shares of economic growth, and globalization policies.” Mishel, supra note 38.
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1% grew 138% between 1979 and 2013, the bottom 90% saw only a 15% increase.40 To be
sure, unemployment is falling as the United States emerges from the recession, yet wage
growth for most workers remains weak, with the average hourly pay dropping.41
In the book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, economist Thomas Piketty surveyed
tax, income, and wealth data for numerous countries going back over two hundred years
and concluded that economic inequality will continue to rise unless government takes
affirmative redistributive steps.42 Piketty’s book was a surprise bestseller that brought
increased attention to the issue of economic inequality due to its accessible recounting
and synthesis of economic history and data from the United States, Europe, and other
developed nations.43 In response to the book’s overwhelming attention and impact, feminist
economists pointed out that economic inequality impacts some groups more harshly.44
Indeed, inequality is more extreme for women and minorities.
By essentializing economic inequality, Piketty and other economists ignore how
“income distribution emanates from at least a tripartite structuring of labor and capital—by
race, gender and class.”45 This criticism of course, is not aimed at Piketty alone. Since the
1990s, feminist economists have challenged mainstream economics for ignoring the role
of gender in the marketplace, which dooms any project for shared prosperity. As Professor
Diane Perrons states, recognizing how social groups “experience wealth and poverty
40 See Lawrence Mishel, Elise Gould & Josh Bivens, Econ. Policy Inst., Wage Stagnation in Nine
Charts 5 (2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/charting-wage-stagnation/ [https://perma.cc/T3RZ-VCUS].
41

Id. at 6.

42

Piketty, supra note 6, at 20–22. He recommends a progressive global tax on capital. Id. at 471, 515.

43 For representative descriptions of the Pikettymania phenomenon, see Jia Lynn Yang, Here’s an Unlikely
Bestseller: A 700-Page Book on 21st Century Economics, Wash. Post, Wonkblog (Apr. 22, 2014), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/04/22/heres-an-unlikely-bestseller-a-700-page-book-on21st-century-economics/ [https://perma.cc/YVY2-3TNR] (stating that the book sold out on Amazon.com and
sold 80,000 copies in two months); Megan McArdle, Piketty’s Capital: An Economist’s Inequality Ideas Are
All the Rage, Bus. Week (May 29, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-05-29/pikettys-capitaleconomists-inequality-ideas-are-all-the-rage [https://perma.cc/73U9-PP9Y].
44 See Diane Perrons, Gendering Inequality: A Note on Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century, 65 Brit.
J. Soc. 667 (2014) (explaining that “inequality is experienced differently depending not only on class, but also
on other aspects of identity including gender”); Kathleen Geier, et al., How Gender Changes Piketty’s Capital in
the Twenty-First Century, Nation, Curve Blog (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/blog/180895/howgender-changes-pikettys-capital-twenty-first-century [https://perma.cc/E3BS-XLPQ] (a group of economists
debates Piketty’s book from a gender perspective).
45

Geier, et al., supra note 44.
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differently is critical to informing the democratic deliberations that Piketty hopes will be
capable of bringing about change.”46 This Article is part of a larger feminist project to bring
gender into the discussion of economic inequality and vice versa.
B. Gender and Economic Inequality
Gender and economic inequality are interrelated. Countries with greater gender
equality also have greater economic growth.47 In the United States, the post-war period
from the 1950s to the 1970s was not only a time of overall economic growth, but also a
time of increased gender equality, as women gained access to education, the workplace,
reproductive justice, and protections against violence, among other advances. However,
economic growth, for most Americans, and the progression of gender equity have stalled.
There are four key trends in gender and economic equality: (1) women’s employment is
essential to the economy, but declining; (2) women get paid less than comparably qualified
men for equal work,48 (3) women are more likely than men to live in poverty, and (4) the
economic realities of women vary sharply by class, even more so than those of men. Overall,
despite advances in women’s political and civil citizenship, “[women] earn less than men,
end up in occupational ghettos, bump up against glass ceilings, and find themselves, in
relation to men, as poor as ever.”49
First, due to wage stagnation in the United States, the contributions of women workers

46

Perrons, supra note 44, at 671.

47 See Naila Kabeer & Luisa Natali, Gender Equality and Economic Growth: Is There a Win-Win?, Inst. Dev.
Stud. 21, 34 (Feb. 2013), https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/Wp417.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WPD-VXWE]; The
World Bank, World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development 3–6 (2012), http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2012/Resources/7778105-1299699968583/7786210-1315936222006/
Complete-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3GL-7DGD]; Katrin Elborgh-Woytek, et al., Women, Work and
the Economy: Macroeconomic Gains from Gender Equity, Int’l Monetary Fund (Sept. 2013), http://www.
imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2013/sdn1310.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8JD-HDH3]; Jonathan Woetzel et al., How
Advancing Women’s Equality Can Add $12 Trillion to Global Growth, McKinsey Global Inst. (Sept. 2015),
http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/employment-and-growth/how-advancing-womens-equality-canadd-12-trillion-to-global-growth [https://perma.cc/US2X-UF42].
48 At the current pace, this divide will not be erased until 2058. See Inst. for Women’s Pol’y Research,
The Status of Women in the States 2015: Employment and Earnings 7 (2015), http://statusofwomendata.
org/app/uploads/2015/02/EE-CHAPTER-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/82LK-KG2N].
49 Michael B. Katz, Mark J. Stern & Jamie J. Fader, Women and the Paradox of Inequality in the TwentiethCentury, 39 J. Soc. Hist. 65 (2005)
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are increasingly essential to their households’ well-being.50 Women’s entrance into the
workforce in the latter half of twentieth century was a profound social and economic
development.51 Still, the United States is unique among developed countries in that the
participation of working-age women in the labor force has been declining,52 from a high of
73% in 1999 to 69% today.53 This decline persists despite the fact that women’s wages have
been rising compared to men’s over the last three decades.54 One cause is a lack of familyfriendly public policies, such as paid parental leave, affordable childcare, or flexibility for
part-time workers.55 The United States is the only developed nation that does not guarantee
paid parental leave.56 In fact, economists Francine Blau and Lawrence Kahn have estimated
that if the United States had gender-friendly policies similar to those in European countries,
women’s labor market participation would be as much as 7% higher.57
50 See Noah, supra note 37, at 53; Hacker & Pierson, supra note 8, at 22; Susan Harkness, The Contribution
of Women’s Employment and Earnings to Household Income Inequality: A Cross-Country Analysis 19 (June
2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Bath), http://www.lisdatacenter.org/conference/
papers/harkness.pdf [https://perma.cc/RKG2-AY6A] (without women’s earnings, income inequality would
increase in the United States by forty-nine percent).
51 See Katz et al., supra note 49, at 67–68; June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage Markets: How
Inequality Is Remaking the American Family 196 (2014).
52 See Ctr. for Am. Progress, supra note 8, at 72; Bureau of Labor Statistics, Women in the Labor
Force: A Databook 1 (2014), http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQP5-H5TD];
Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, Female Labor Supply: Why is the US Falling Behind? 1–2 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18702, 2013) (noting that in the United States, federal law gives
women only twelve weeks unpaid leave) [hereinafter Blau & Kahn, Female Labor Supply].
53 See Ctr. for Am. Progress, supra note 8, at 132; Mary Gregory, Gender and Economic Inequality, in
The Oxford Handbook of Economic Inequality 284, 288 (Brian Nolan, Wiemer Salverda & Timothy M.
Smeeding eds., 2011).
54 See Patricia Cohen, Among the Poor, Women Feel Inequality More Deeply, N.Y. Times: Upshot (Aug.
18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/19/upshot/among-the-poor-women-feel-inequality-more-deeply.
html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=0 [https://perma.cc/D53X-8GCP].
55 Ctr. for Am. Progress, supra note 8, at 72, 134; Randy Albelda, Gender Impacts of the “Great
Recession” in the United States, in Women & Austerity: The Economic Crisis and the Future for Gender
Equality 82, 83 (Maria Karamessini & Jill Rubery eds., 2013) [hereinafter Albelda, Gender Impacts].
56 See Elaine McCrate, Employer-oriented Schedule Flexibility, Gender and Family Care, in Handbook of
Research on Gender and Economic Life [hereinafter Handbook on Gender] 273 (Deborah M. Figart &
Tonia L. Warnecke eds., 2013) (the United States lacks “even the most rudimentary forms of flexibility such as
paid vacation days or sick leave”).
57 Blau & Kahn, Female Labor Supply, supra note 52, at 1, 7. Men fared worse than women in terms of job
loss during the economic recession from 2007–2009, but fared better in the post-recession economy with larger
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Second, the gender gap in pay—women make about seventy-eight cents to every dollar
earned by men58—adversely impacts households and the national economy. While the gap
shrank from approximately 60% in 1978 to around 78% today,59 it has been stubbornly
hard to erase—particularly for women of color—with little improvement since 1990.60 As
a result, “the economic fortunes of families typically remain disproportionately dependent
on what dads earn, even when the moms work, too.”61 One cause of the gender gap is family
status, meaning the employment interruptions that women experience due to childbearing
and caregiving.62
Occupational segregation also contributes to the gender gap. In 2010, 49% of men
and 41.1% of women worked in an occupation where at least 75% of other workers
were of the same gender.63 Occupations dominated by women, such as administrative
support, are lower paid than comparable occupations held by men, such as construction or
transportation.64 As women move into a formerly male profession, pay in that profession
job growth. See Albelda, Gender Impacts, supra note 55, at 82–88.
58 See DeNavas-Walt & Proctor, supra note 10, at 7; see also Am. Ass’n of Univ. Women, The Simple
Truth about the Gender Pay Gap: 2015 Edition 3 (2015), http://www.aauw.org/files/2015/02/The-SimpleTruth_Spring-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/EA3F-FM6V].
59 See Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender Pay Gap: Have Women Gone as Far as They
Can? 21 Acad. Mgmt. Persp. 7, 9 (2007) [hereinafter Blau & Kahn, Have Women Gone]; Gregory, supra
note 53, at 296. The gap is larger for older women than for younger women; it is 95% for women ages 16–
24 and 75% for women ages 55–64. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Rep. No. 1031,
Highlights of Women’s Earnings in 2010 9 (2011), http://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/womens-earnings/
archive/womensearnings_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/GY6K-HNBA]; see also Am. Ass’n of Univ. Women,
supra note 58, at 11.
60 See Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The U.S. Gender Pay Gap in the 1990s: Slowing Convergence,
60 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 45 (2007).
61

Noah, supra note 37, at 49.

62 Gregory, supra note 53, at 293; Blau & Kahn, Have Women Gone, supra note 59, at 10; John Iceland,
Poverty in America: A Handbook 101 (3d ed. 2013).
63 See Ariane Hegewisch & Hannah Liepmann, Occupational Segregation and the Gender Wage Gap in the
US, in Handbook on Gender, supra note 56, at 200. While occupational segregation declined significantly
during the 1970s and 1980s due to legal reforms and enforcement, further progress has not only slowed, but
reversed. Id. See also Iceland, supra note 62, at 100 (“women’s work is typically accorded both lower status
and lower earnings than occupations with high concentrations of men”).
64 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Rep. No. 1034, Women in the Labor Force:
A Databook 55–68 (2011), http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FCL-7UBV].
Men earn more than women even in female-dominated occupations, such as elementary school teachers. Id.
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declines.65 Discrimination is an additional factor, as “women still earn less than similar
men even when all measured characteristics are taken into account.”66 Affirmative evidence
of discrimination includes “a well-documented ‘wage premium’ for married men that is
not evident in the pay of married women; a wage penalty for mothers, but not fathers; and
a penalty for women’s leaves based on the expectation that [women] will take longer and
more frequent leaves than [men] typically do.”67
There is a paradox that women have advanced quickly in the American workplace, but
face a larger gender gap than in other developed nations.68 Women’s depressed earnings
mean they have fewer financial assets, less savings for retirement or emergencies, and
higher poverty rates.69 By contrast, some estimate that closing the gender gap would
increase the United States’ gross domestic product by 5%,70 and halve the poverty rate.71
Third, women are disproportionately represented in the low-wage labor market,72 and

at 59–67 (Table 18); Cf. Vivien Labaton, Five Myths About the Gender Pay Gap, Wash. Post (July 25, 2014)
(occupational segregation is only partly to blame for the gap because “the pay gap is widest in some of the
highest-paying fields,” such as medicine and law).
65 Asaf Levanon & Paula England, Occupational Feminization and Pay: Assessing Causal Dynamics Using
1950-2000 U.S. Census Data, 88 Soc. Forces 865 (2009).
66 Blau & Kahn, Have Women Gone, supra note 59, at 12. They estimate discrimination to account for about
forty-one percent of the gap. Id.
67 Katherine T. Bartlett, Deborah L. Rhode & Joanna L. Grossman, Gender and the Law: Theory,
Doctrine, Commentary 60 (6th ed. 2013). While the gap is sometimes attributed to women’s alleged
preferences for working less, the reality is that women who worked full-time and year-round during at least 12
of 15 consecutive years still earn only 64% of similarly situated men. See Stephen J. Rose & Heidi I. Hartmann,
Still a Man’s Labor Market: The Long-Term Earnings Gap, Inst. For Women’s Pol’y Res. 10 (2004).
68

See Gregory, supra note 53, at 296.

69

See Hegewisch & Liepmann, supra note 63, at 200.

70

Elborgh-Woytek, et al., supra note 47, at 4.

71 Heidi Hartmann, Jeffrey Hayes & Jennifer Clark, How Equal Pay for Working Women Would Reduce
Poverty and Grow the American Economy, Inst. for Women’s Pol’y Res. 1, 4 (2014), http://www.iwpr.
org/publications/pubs/how-equal-pay-for-working-women-would-reduce-poverty-and-grow-the-americaneconomy [https://perma.cc/5U4Q-LJGW].
72 Low-income is defined by researchers and policymakers as having “family income below 200 percent of
the poverty line.” Randy Albelda, Low-wage Mothers on the Edge in the US, in Handbook on Gender, supra
note 56, at 257, 259 [hereinafter Albelda, Low-wage Mothers].
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more likely than men to be poor.73 Nearly six in ten adults who live in poverty are women.74
This disparity results from the lower employment and wage levels of women75 as well as
women’s higher likelihood of heading single parent families.76 Minimum wage workers are
more likely to be women.
Single mothers are in a particularly precarious position; their poverty rate was 39.6%
compared to 7.6% for families with children headed by a married couple.77 Single mothers
face the “triple whammy” of earning less than men; earning less than other women;
and serving in the dual role of caregiver and breadwinner.78 40% of single mothers are
employed in low-wage work,79 and 12% of single mothers who work full-time, year-round
nevertheless live in poverty.80 For our poorest women, welfare was reformed in 1996
to require recipients to work, but the low-wage workplace has changed little to support
their efforts, offering measly wages, few benefits, and a lack of scheduling flexibility.81
Meanwhile, the social safety net catches fewer and fewer eligible families.82
73 Joan Entmacher, et al., Insecure & Unequal: Poverty and Income among Women and Families
2000–2013 1 (2014), http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/final_2014_nwlc_poverty_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8FGF-EXWS]. See also Gregory, supra note 53, at 285 (Women “remain underrepresented
in prestige professions and ‘top jobs’; they typically receive lower pay; and they feature disproportionately
among the low-paid. Equality of outcomes in the labor market has not been achieved.”); Albelda, Gender
Impacts, supra note 55, at 83 (examining the “large share of female-headed households that disproportionately
fill the bottom ranks”).
74 Poverty rates are significantly higher for families headed by Black, Hispanic, and Native American
single mothers. See Entmacher, et al., supra note 73, at 3. For these women of color, it is harder to obtain
employment, their jobs are more likely to be low-paid, and their wages are depressed by both race and gender
discrimination. See Marlene Kim, Race and Ethnicity in the Workplace, in Handbook on Gender, supra
note 56, at 218, 219–26. For instance, the author’s study showed that “black women were underpaid 9 percent
because of their race, 15 percent because of their gender, and 3 percent because of the intersection of both
gender and race.” Id. at 231.
75

See supra notes 50 to 67 and accompanying text.

76

See Iceland, supra note 62, at 99–100.

77

See Entmacher, et al., supra note 73, at 4.

78

Albelda, Low-wage Mothers, supra note 72, at 257, 258.

79

Id. at 257, 264.

80

See Entmacher, et al., supra note 73, at 4.

81

See Albelda, Low-wage Mothers, supra note 72, at 257, 263, 267–68.

82

See Shaefer & Edin, supra note 11, at 29–30.
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Working poor women struggle to procure affordable childcare while enduring low
pay, irregular and part-time hours, and lack of benefits.83 Often these women work as
childcare providers for more affluent women, while unable to afford childcare for their
own children.84 The United States’ low levels of governmental support for paid childcare
“exacerbates the inequality among women through the privatization of care costs.”85 Due
to societal gender norms, women provide the majority of unpaid household labor,86 and
women’s care responsibilities subject them to discrimination in the workplace, where the
ideal worker is defined by a male norm.87 Employers treat low-wage women workers as
“unencumbered,” subjecting them to variable and unpredictable work hours, and placing
women in a bind when it comes to caring for their own children.88
Fourth, the life experiences of women vary sharply by class, mirroring the overall
pulling away of the top 1%.89 One stark difference is that women in the top 1% live on
average 10 years longer than those in the bottom 1%. 90 Moreover, the life expectancies of
women in the bottom 40% are shrinking rather than improving.91
Although women are living comfortably at the top, it is worth noting that even in the
top 1%, women still lag behind men. In fact, the gender wage gap is actually largest for

83

See Albelda, Gender Impacts, supra note 55, at 84; Ctr. for Am. Progress, supra note 8, at 133.

84

See Albelda, Gender Impacts, supra note 55, at 84.

85

Id.

86

See Nelson, Gender and Caring, in Handbook on Gender, supra note 56, at 64.

87 See Heather Boushey, The Role of the Government in US Work-family Conflict, in Handbook on Gender,
supra note 56, at 307, 309.
88

See McCrate, supra note 56, at 279.

89 See Albelda, Gender Impacts, supra note 55, at 84. Lisa Pruitt explains that geography is also a powerful
determinant of one’s class and gender experience, stating, “the culture wars are now largely being fought—at
least rhetorically—across the rural-urban divide.” Lisa R. Pruitt, The Geography of the Class Culture Wars, 34
Seattle U.L. Rev. 767, 772 (2011). See also generally Lisa R. Pruitt, Toward a Feminist Theory of the Rural,
2007 Utah L. Rev. 421 (2007).
90 Raj Chetty et al., The Association Between Income and Life Expectancy in the United States, 2001-2014,
315 J. Am. Med. Assoc. 1750 (2016).
91 See Josh Zumbrun, The Richer You Are the Older You’ll Get, Wall St. J., Apr. 18, 2014, http://blogs.wsj.
com/economics/2014/04/18/the-richer-you-are-the-older-youll-get/ [https://perma.cc/L4ZV-H5UT].
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women at the top of the income scale.92 The rise of overall economic inequality in the
United States is due in part to a class of multi-million dollar earning supermanagers.93 They
are mostly male.94 In 2012, executive officer positions at Fortune 500 companies were
only 14% female, while 25% of these companies had no female executives at all.95 Among
the superrich, women constitute only forty-two of the four hundred richest Americans,
and of these women, thirty-eight accrued their wealth by inheriting from their fathers and
husbands.96 In short, “[t]he glass ceiling is still there” at the top.97
All these trends are “economically inefficient and socially inequitable.”98 They result
from public policies that are stuck in “an early twentieth-century mindset about who works
and who cares, one that no longer reflects the ways that American families work and live.”99
The lower tier of the economy is starting to look more and more like a gendered economy,
where women are paid less and segmented into traditionally female occupations. This spells
bad times ahead for both men and women. Indeed, due to stagnation in the labor market,
women’s workplace disadvantages are spreading to low-wage men. These disadvantages
92 See Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends, and Explanations
3 (Inst. for the Study of Labor Discussion Paper No. 9656, 2016), http://ftp.iza.org/dp9656.pdf [https://perma.
cc/ZQD5-QBYK]. Relatedly, the pay gap for women in management-related occupations is seventy-four cents
to every dollar earned by a similarly situated man. See Randy Albelda, Robert Drago & Steven Shulman,
Unlevel Playing Fields: Understanding Wage Inequality and Discrimination (3d ed. 2010).
93 See Piketty, supra note 6, at 298–303. The rise of the super wealthy has serious consequences for society;
it extends beyond “private luxury [to] public power.” David Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 Harv.
L. Rev. 626, 640 (2014). As Grewal explains, the superrich “can buy media corporations and private military
contractors; they can sway individual elections and determine electoral trends.” Id. at 640 (footnotes omitted).
Through philanthropy, they can spend at levels rivaling governments “and thus reorient humanitarian, cultural,
and scientific agendas to their personal priorities.” Id. “They can coopt state functions . . . through privatizations,
special bailouts, and preferential treatment of various kinds, which socializes risk while privatizing profit.” Id.
94

See Perrons, supra note 44, at 672.

95

Carbone & Cahn, supra note 51, at 64.

96

Noah, supra note 37, at 49.

97 See Fatih Guvenen, Greg Kaplan & Jae Song, The Glass Ceiling and the Paper Floor: Gender Differences
Among Top Earners, 1981–2012 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20560, 2014),
https://fguvenendotcom.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/gks_top_earners_2014_wpsep2014.pdf [https://perma.
cc/34EX-NFCZ]. “[T]he shares of females in the top percentiles were below 15% for the top 0.1 percent, and
below 20% for the second 0.9 percent.” Id. at 13.
98

Gregory, supra note 53, at 285.

99

Boushey, supra note 87, at 307.
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“includ[e] stagnating male median wages, reduced men’s labour force participation, a
reduction in the percentage of men with employment-based benefits, a decline in male
breadwinners, and growth in men’s share in low-wage and part-time work.”100 In short,
gender-based economic inequality is bad for everyone.
C. Feminist Economic Theory
The insights of feminist economic theory are helpful in expanding feminist legal
analysis beyond gender to incorporate the relationship between gender, class and law. The
field of feminist economics101 is a response to mainstream, or neoclassical, economics and its
animating model that individuals are rational actors who seek to maximize their economic
self-interest.102 This maximization occurs in markets “in which perfect competition prevails.
In these markets, goods are exchanged for goods, with money serving only as a neutral
intermediary in the exchange.”103 In this view, the outcome of transactions is efficient if
one party is better off and no party is worse off—efficiency is the goal.104 “The market
100 Albelda, Gender Impacts, supra note 55, at 98. Notably, among men, only those with college educations
have seen their wages increase over the past four decades. Iceland, supra note 62, at 102.
101 On the history of the feminist economics movement, which began in the early 1990s, see Marianne A.
Ferber & Julie A. Nelson, Beyond Economic Man, Ten Years Later, in Feminist Economics Today: Beyond
Economic Man [hereinafter Feminist Economics] 2–11 (Marianne A. Ferber & Julie A. Nelson eds., 2003).
“Feminist economics emerged from dissatisfaction with the mainstream model for all the elements of economic
life left out and rendered invisible, particularly traditionally female responsibilities for housework, childcare,
and broader care of the family and community.” Marilyn Power, A Social Provisioning Approach to Gender
and Economic Life, in Handbook on Gender, supra note 56, at 7, 9. Feminist economics is one of several
heterodox economics movements critical of inadequacies within neoclassical economics. See Robert Ashford,
Socioeconomics and Professional Responsibilities in Teaching Law-Related Economic Issues, 41 San Diego
L. Rev. 133, 137–38 (2004) (listing various schools of thought); Kenneth M. Casebeer & Charles J. Whalen,
Taking Interdependence and Production More Seriously: Toward Mutual Rationality and a More Useful Law
and Economics, 66 U. Miami L. Rev. 141, 142 (2001) (listing core critiques of heterodox economists).
102 See Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 2 (9th ed. 2014) (Describing economics as “the
science of rational choice in a world—our world—in which resources are limited in relation to human wants.
The task of economics, so understood, is to explore the implications of assuming that human beings are rational
maximizers of their ends in life, their satisfactions—equivalently, their ‘self-interest’ . . . .”).
103 Charles R.P. Pouncy, Contemporary Financial Innovation: Orthodoxy and Alternatives, 51 SMU L. Rev.
505, 541 (1998).
104 See Introduction, in Feminism Confronts Homo Economicus, supra note 22, at xiv. Note that the
term “neoclassical economics” includes many strands and theories; this Article summarizes its foundational
precepts. See Tony Lawson, What is this “School” Called Neoclassical Economics? Cambridge J. Econ. 1
(2013) (the term neoclassical is “employed to denote a range of substantive theories and policy stances”).
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becomes the instrument of allocation, and individual self-interested economic decisions
collectively achieve an optimal societal equilibrium.”105 The law and economics movement
applies these principles both to explain and improve law.106 In its decisions impacting
working class women, the Supreme Court clings to neoclassical economic assumptions, as
incorporated into law through the law and economics movement and its emphasis on using
law to promote economic efficiency.107
Feminist economists assert that the neoclassical economic “models . . . often marginalized
women’s experience, assumed away discrimination or differentials of power, or assumed
that any observed differences were the outcome of ‘essential’ differences between men
and women, and therefore were natural, inevitable, and even desirable.”108 Rather than

105

Pouncy, supra note 103, at 541.

106 As with neoclassical economics, the law and economics movement has an “array of literatures,
submovements, and schools of thought.” Anita Bernstein, Whatever Happened to Law and Economics? 64 Md.
L. Rev. 303, 305 (2005). Still, its major precepts hinge on rational choice, efficiency and/or wealth maximization,
and faith in markets. Id. at 308–18. For background on how the law and economics movement gained a foothold
within the legal academy despite considerable critique, see Thomas O. McGarity, A Movement, a Lawsuit, and
the Integrity of Sponsored Law and Economics Research, 21 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 51, 61–62 (2010); Jon
Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power
Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 129, 139–47, 272–78 (2003). For the history of law and
economics and its antecedents, see generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Law and Economics in the United States: A
Brief Historical Survey, 19 Cambridge J. Econ. 331–52 (1995).
107 See Introduction, in Feminism Confronts Homo Economicus, supra note 22, at xiii–xv. A small group
of feminist legal theorists have critiqued law and economics along the same lines as feminist economists.
See Gillian K. Hadfield, Feminism, Fairness, and Welfare: An Invitation to Feminist Law and Economics,
1 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 285, 286 (“if adopting law and economics methodology means restricting one’s
work to efficiency analysis and income redistribution, then the value of economics is substantially limited”);
Barbara Ann White, Economic Efficiency, Economic Efficiency and the Parameters of Fairness: A Marriage of
Marketplace Morals and the Ethic of Care, 15 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1, 11–12 (2005) [hereinafter White,
Economic Efficiency] (discussing the tension between law and economics scholars and feminist scholars and
proposing that both groups can learn from the other). For a robust critique of neoclassical economic theory
from a feminist perspective, see Neil H. Buchanan, Playing with Fire: Feminist Legal Theorists and the Tools
of Economics, in Feminism Confronts Homo Economicus, supra note 22, at 61–93.
108 Power, supra note 101, at 8. See also Paula England, Separative and Soluble Selves: Dichotomous
Thinking in Economics, in Feminist Economics, supra note 101, at 33, 43 (summarizing principles of
neoclassical economics); Drucilla K. Barker, Feminist Economics as a Theory and Method, in Handbook on
Gender, supra note 56, at 18, 19–20 (same); Preface, in Feminist Economics, supra note 101, at vii (feminist
economics is a response to “biases which give market relations pride of place over family and social relations,
emphasize heroic individualism while ignoring interdependence, and define rationality so narrowly . . . leave
the discipline impoverished”).
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“speaking truth to power,” neoclassical economics “accommodates and naturalizes it.”109
By contrast, feminist economists stress the interdependence of social structures and human
relationships.110 Expanding economic inquiry to this “more complex, holistic” view111 allows
us to see how economic life both shapes and is influenced by gender norms.112 It focuses
less on formal models, and more on how actual people live their lives.113 It recognizes that
gender matters to economic outcomes, given that “women still bear a disproportionate bulk
of the burdens of poverty [and] social and economic exclusion . . . .”114
Feminist economists study a wide range of issues and apply a variety of approaches,
and this summary necessarily simplifies much complex thought.115 There are at least four
overarching methodological commitments within the field, each of which is tied to a critique
or failure of mainstream economic thought.116 First, feminist economists include domestic
and care work within the study of economic systems.117 Domestic and care work is central
to women’s lives,118 yet traditional economics excludes care work from its analysis, as well
as from standard measures of productivity, such as the Gross National Product.119 These
109

Barker, supra note 108, at 25.

110 Deborah M. Figart & Tonia L. Warnecke, Introduction, in Handbook on Gender, supra note 56, at
1 (“the economy is embedded in society”); Barker, supra note 108, at 19 (“Feminist economists have been
critical of the assumption of self-interested individualism and the lack of any interactions, except those
organized according to the principles of self-interested contractual exchange, because these assumptions
excluded considerations of the dependent children, the elderly, and the infirm.”). See also Barbara Ann White,
Feminist Foundations for the Law of Business: One Law and Economics Scholar’s Survey and (Re)view, 10
UCLA Women’s L.J. 39, 48 (1999) [hereinafter White, Feminist Foundations] (describing the centrality of the
ethic of care to feminist thought in which “concern for others is of paramount importance”).
111

Power, supra note 101, at 14.

112

Figart & Warnecke, supra note 110, at 1.

113

Barker, supra note 108, at 20.

114

Id. at 18.

115 See Power, supra note 101, at 11; Barker, supra note 108, at 23; Myra H. Strober, The Application of
Mainstream Economics Constructs to Education: A Feminist Analysis, in Feminist Economics, supra note
101, at 135, 137.
116

Power, supra note 101, at 11.

117

Id. at 11; England & Folbre, Contracting for Care, in Feminist Economics, supra note 101, at 61, 63.

118

Id. at 63.

119

See Ann Laquer Estin, Can Families Be Efficient? A Feminist Appraisal, in Feminism Confronts Homo
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exclusions serve to keep women “in their place.”120 Feminist economists contend that care
work, usually unpaid or low-paid, has immense value for society, even as its workers are
often degraded and devalued.121 In this vein, feminist economists recognize “understandings
of motivation that do not fall under narrow or tautological notions of self-interest,”122 such
as moral obligation and emotional connection.123 This mix of motivations makes caring
labor valuable for society, but also depresses care work wages. Feminist economists also
highlight that women’s wages suffer as a result of their care work obligations and that
women continue to assume most household care responsibilities even if they work outside
the home.124
Second, feminist economists maintain that economic success should be measured in
terms of human well-being—or the “ability to lead a life one values”—and not simply
by efficiency or profit-maximization norms.125 Moreover, even if transactions operate
efficiently, outcomes can be unfair when the bargaining positions of actors are skewed

Economicus, supra note 22, at 423, 424. Many feminist economists respond to the work of Nobel Prize
winning economist Gary Becker, who theorized about families, namely that division of labor within families
based on gender furthers utility and that male heads of household are altruistic, thereby coordinating family
behavior. For a summary of Becker and his school of New Home Economics, see Philomena Tsoukala, Gary
Becker, Legal Feminism, and the Costs of Moralizing Care, 16 Colum. J. Gender & L. 357 (2007) (arguing
that feminists should use Becker’s theories to enhance feminist goals).
120
Marilyn Waring, If Women Counted: A New Feminist Economics 245 (1988). Waring’s
groundbreaking work has led to new methods of accounting for women’s well-being and the benefits of
household work. See Terje Langeland, Women Unaccounted for in Global Economy Proves Waring Influence,
Bloomberg (June 18, 2003), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-06-18/women-unaccountedfor-in-global-economy-proves-waring-influence [https://perma.cc/FQV8-DLD7]. There is a debate within
feminism about the commodification of household labor. See generally Katharine B. Silbaugh, Commodification
and Women’s Household Labor, in Feminism Confronts Homo Economicus, supra note 22, at 338–72.
121

See infra Part IV.A.

122 Power, supra note 101, at 10. Legal scholar Barbara Ann White makes a similar reflection with regard
to the law and economics movement, stating, “neoclassical law and economics views law as merely serving
to facilitate the economic efficiency of the market and insists that an economy should be evaluated by its
aggregated national wealth,” thus “ignoring any notice of the number of poor or the standard of living among
the many.” White, Feminist Foundations, supra note 110, at 67.
123

England & Folbre, supra note 117, at 62–63.

124

See Nelson, supra note 86, at 62, 64–66.

125

Power, supra note 101, at 12.
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at the start. Thus, ethics should be part of economic analysis.126 This perspective shifts
from a focus on efficiency to encompass a range of values, such as caring, quality of life,
responsibilities to community, and economic justice.127 Nancy Folbre and Julie Nelson
write that neoclassical economics is based on stereotypically male norms of autonomy
and individual accomplishment, whereas women are traditionally associated with social
and physical connection.128 As a result, “[n]eglecting the ‘connected’ aspects of human
life . . . is a form of gender bias, in that aspects of human life traditionally associated with
femininity are being irrationally downplayed.”129
A third feminist economic principle is that human agency is essential to assessing
economic events.130 Accordingly, “questions of power, and unequal access to power, are
part of the analysis from the beginning.”131 In this analysis, the study of processes is just as
important as the evaluation of outcomes.132 Feminist economists analyze power dynamics
within the household, within the workplace, and within the public sphere.133 For instance,
within the household, feminist economists have explored how people who remain outside
the market are vulnerable to abuse by their more powerful partners, and also face potential
economic catastrophe when a marriage dissolves.134 As to the marketplace, most economics
texts view the sale of labor as an exchange benefitting both parties. “No mention is made
of the fact that the employer has power over the employee, or of the particular power
126 Id. at 13. See also White, Economic Efficiency, supra note 107, at 15–17 (describing the feminist ethic
of care). White states that the ethic of care is “an alternative moral philosophy that is needs-based and guides
community decisions according to differences among individuals.” Id. at 16.
127 Power, supra note 101, at 9. See also White, Feminist Foundations, supra note 110, at 66–67 (“the
economic well-being of a society should be the distribution of income, and that a measure of an economically
stable economy is one which maximizes the number of individuals who can earn a ‘decent wage’”).
128

Nancy Folbre & Julie A. Nelson, For Love or Money—or Both?, 14 J. Econ. Persp. 123, 131 (2000).

129

Id.

130

Power, supra note 101, at 12.

131 Id. at 12. Paula England discusses how people can be both autonomous and interconnected, contrary to
assumed dichotomies within neoclassical economics. See England, supra note 108, at 35–40.
132

Power, supra note 101, at 12.

133 See e.g., Bina Agarwal, “Bargaining” and Gender Relations: Within and Beyond the Household, 3
Feminist Econ. 1 (1997) (discussing bargaining models within families, the market, communities and the
state).
134 See Geoff Schneider & Jean Shackelford, Economics Standards and Lists: Proposed Antidotes for
Feminist Economics, 7 Feminist Econ. 77, 83 (2001) (citing the work of Barbara Bergmann).
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inequities in the exchange that reinforce the employer’s power.”135 Feminist analysis also
provides a richer description of how businesses actually act, as opposed to how models
predict they will act.136 With regard to the state, feminists note government’s potential
to correct for market imperfections, but also to be captured by powerful interests and to
reinforce gender inequality.
Fourth, (and here economists have borrowed from feminist legal theory and the
foundational insights of Kimberlé Crenshaw137), economic analysis should include
intersectional understandings of how class, race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and
other identities interact.138 The intersection of these forms of oppression generates a specific
life experience, and as a result, efforts to enhance equality must take into account these
multiple dimensions.139 “Without a vision that is sensitive to the different but interactive
effects of race and gender on economic outcomes, we would not see the differences in
patterns of discrimination nor be impelled to ask how we might explain them.”140 This also
means that feminist theorists need to be aware of their own privilege and to interrogate
their own values and ideology.141
These principles provide a tool for assessing and reforming law, which of course,
helps to shape the economy. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court opinions studied here are a
depressing rejection of these feminist economic ideals. In the conservative Court majority’s
135

Id.

136 Julie A. Nelson, Separative and Soluble Firms: Androcentric Bias and Business Ethics, in Feminist
Economics, supra note 101, at 81, 96 (describing businesses as “entities that involve real, living people who
form complex economic (and social) relationships”).
137 Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Chi. L.F. 139 (1989); Kimberlé
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43
Stan. L. Rev. 1241 (1991).
138 Power, supra note 101, at 13. See also S. Charusheela, Intersectionality, in Handbook on Gender,
supra note 56, at 32, 32–43.
139

Charusheela, supra note 138, at 32–33.

140 Lisa Saunders & William Darity Jr., Feminist Theory and Racial Based Economic Inequality, in Feminist
Economics, supra note 101, at 101, 109. An example of this sort of analysis is in Gary Dymski et al., Race,
Gender, Power, and the US Subprime Mortgage and Foreclosure Crisis: A Meso Analysis, 19 Feminist Econ.
124 (2013) (describing how banking strategies underlying the foreclosure crisis were shaped by and reinforced
patterns of racial and gender inequality).
141

Barker, supra note 108, at 27.
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law and economics viewpoint, government regulation hinders efficient outcomes generated
by the market, “thus obviating the need for laws that redistribute rights and resources in
an egalitarian manner.”142 Not surprisingly, the Court’s narrow view of the economy leads
to results that are bleak for women workers.143 As explained below, the Court’s opinions
devalue the contributions of care workers, elevate profits over the needs of workers,
reinforce power structures that oppress women and limit their economic security, and apply
harmful gender, race, and class stereotypes about women workers. The three decisions
analyzed below are the Court’s leading, most recent opinions regarding women’s roles
within the low-wage workforce. Collectively, they impact millions of women, including
women who were not parties to the actual cases. In each case, the workers lost by a close
5-4 decision. The analysis below does not focus on the substantive law implicated by the
decisions, but rather, examines the underlying economic and gender assumptions of the
majority and the dissents.
II. Wal-Mart v. Dukes and Modern-Day Discrimination
A. The Economics of Discrimination
Over fifty years after Congress passed Title VII and outlawed employment discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,144 such discrimination still exists.
Evidence of discrimination arises from continued high rates of employment discrimination
complaints,145 as well as studies by labor economists.146 For instance, blind audit studies
142 See Introduction, in Feminism Confronts Homo Economicus, supra note 22, at xiv; Terence Dougherty,
Economic Rhetoric, Economic Individualism, and the Law and Economics School, in Feminism Confronts
Homo Economicus, supra note 22, at 3.
143 These outcomes are consistent with a general pro-business tilt of the Roberts Court. See Lee Epstein,
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 1431,
1472 (2013) (stating that the “Roberts Court is much friendlier to business” than its preceding courts).
144

Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.

145 See Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2015, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Commission, http://
eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm [https://perma.cc/3WGL-P4NT] (showing over 88,000
discrimination claims filed in 2014). While success rates in litigation are low, this is not due to a lack of merit.
See Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law,
96 Minn. L. Rev. 1275, 1282–83, 1288 (2012). See also Michael Selmi, Sex Discrimination in the Nineties,
Seventies Style: Case Studies in the Preservation of Male Workplace Norms, 9 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 1,
4–24 (2005) [hereinafter Selmi, Sex Discrimination] (describing major class action employment discrimination
lawsuits, most of which resulted in settlements).
146

See Selmi, Sex Discrimination, supra note 145, at 26–42 (summarizing results of empirical studies
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have shown that female orchestra candidates are more likely to be selected if they audition
behind a screen, where gender is invisible to selectors.147 Similarly, studies have shown that
employers are 50% more likely to select resumes with racially identifiable white names over
identical resumes with stereotypically Black names.148 Likewise, statistical studies reveal
managerial preferences for employees who share the same race as the manager.149 The
gender pay gap is yet another indication and result of discrimination.150 Studies establish
that even after controlling for a variety of variables that contribute to the pay gap—such as
personal preference, individual qualifications, occupation, and industry—a remaining gap
is attributable to discrimination.151
Discrimination has both individual and societal harms. It is unfair and dignitystripping to reward or punish workers on the basis of innate traits that are irrelevant to job
performance. Discrimination can result in psychological injuries ranging from depression

and their limitations); John J. Donohue III, The Law and Economics of Antidiscrimination Law 38–46 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11631, 2005), http://www.nber.org/papers/w11631.pdf [https://
perma.cc/WY7V-89ZA] (same).
147 Claudia Goldin & Ceclilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of `Blind’ Auditions on Female
Musicians, 90 Am. Econ. Rev. 715 (2000).
148 Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and
Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 Am. Econ. Rev. 991–1013 (2004). See also
Devah Pager, Race, Ethnicity, and Inequality in the U.S. Labor Market: Critical Issues in the New Millennium:
The Use of Field Experiments for Studies of Employment Discrimination: Contributions, Critiques, and
Directions for the Future, 609 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 104, 112 (2007) (“[e]ach study comes to
the same basic conclusion—that race matters in hiring decisions”).
149 Laura Guliano, David I. Levine & Jonathan Leonard, Manager Race and the Race of New Hires, 27
J. Lab. Econ. 1, 37 (2008), http://www.irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/150-07.pdf [https://perma.cc/95ZWMLGS].
150 See, e.g., Judy Goldberg Dey & Catherine Hill, Behind the Pay Gap 3 (2007), http://www.aauw.
org/files/2013/02/Behind-the-Pay-Gap.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6GK-H3MN]; Francine D. Blau & Lawrence
M. Kahn, Gender Differences in Pay, 14 J. Econ. Persp. 75, 82 (2000).
151 See Cheryl Travis et al., Tracking the Gender Pay Gap: A Case Study, 33 Psychol. Women Q. 410,
410–11 (2009) (citing studies); Gowri Ramachandran, Pay Transparency, 116 Pa. St. L. Rev. 1043, 1050–51
(2012) (describing studies of the race and gender pay gap that controlled for multiple factors and concluded that
discrimination was a factor). There is also a gender gap in management; women are 49% of the non-managerial
workforce, but only 40% of managers. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Women in Management:
Analysis of Female Managers’ Representation, Characteristics, and Pay 6 (2010), http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d10892r.pdf [https://perma.cc/NDU8-WX3Y].

24

Columbia Journal of Gender and Law

32.1

to post-traumatic stress disorder.152 Moreover, discrimination results in under-utilization of
human capital and skills.153 Not surprisingly, discrimination has economic consequences.
Studies show that businesses with greater gender diversity, and that utilize equal pay and
promotion practices have higher revenues, profitability, and market share due to greater
employee loyalty and productivity.154 The converse is true as well. Moreover, four in ten
mothers are primary breadwinners for their families. 155 Thus, wages that are depressed due
to discrimination result in less income for families to spend on goods and services. Class
actions are one effective means for combating discrimination. Class actions are important
because they are not only efficient, but they also allow plaintiffs to uncover evidence of
systemic practices and to aggregate low-value claims that they otherwise could not afford
to bring.156 However, the Supreme Court limited the availability of this tool in Wal-Mart
v. Dukes.

152
See Wizdom Powell Hammond, Marion Gillen & Irene H. Yen, Workplace Discrimination and
Depressive Symptoms: A Study of Multi-Ethnic Hospital Employees, 2 Race & Soc. Probs. 19 (2010), http://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2867471/ [https://perma.cc/SKF4-LYLM] (“Exposure to workplace
discrimination has . . . been found to harm mental health from diminished psychological well-being, increased
risk of psychological distress, and pronounced depressive symptoms.”); Jane Goodman-Delahunty &
William E. Foote, Evaluation for Workplace Discrimination and Harassment 81 (2010) (describing
psychological impacts of discrimination).
153
Scott A. Moss, Women Choosing Diverse Workplaces: A Rational Preference with Disturbing
Implications for Both Occupational Segregation and Economic Analysis of Law, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 9 (2004)
(“Not only does discrimination lower human capital, it also negatively influences the strategic choices of
discriminated-against groups.”). See also id. at 13 (describing harms of discrimination).
154 See Nancy Levit, Megacases, Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of Workplace Reform, 49 B.C. L. Rev.
367, 426 (2008).
155 See Catherine Rampell, U.S. Women on the Rise as Family Breadwinner, N.Y.Times, May 29, 2013, at
B1 (reporting on results of a Pew Research Center analysis of Census and polling data).
156 See Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 106
Nw. U. L Rev. Colloquy 34, 36–37 (2011); Roger W. Reinsch & Sonia Goltz, You Can’t Get There From
Here: Implications of the Walmart v. Dukes Decision for Addressing Second-Generation Discrimination, 9 Nw.
J. L. & Soc. Pol’y 264, 267 (2014); Melissa Hart, The Possibility of Avoiding Discrimination: Considering
Compliance and Liability, 39 Conn. L. Rev. 1623, 1634 (2007) (“These claims require for their success that
workplace decisions be evaluated in the aggregate.”).
The Court has also limited the availability of class actions in other cases. In AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, Justice Scalia authored a 5-4 majority opinion that allows corporations and employers to use
arbitration clauses to shield themselves from class actions. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S.
333 (2011). On the impact of that case, see Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
Impedes Access to Justice, 90 Or. L. Rev. 703 (2012).
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B. Background of the Case
In 2001, a proposed class of over 1.5 million current and past female employees filed
a complaint against Wal-Mart alleging that Wal-Mart paid them less than men, despite
women’s overall better performance and greater seniority, and provided women with fewer
opportunities for promotion to management.157 Wal-Mart is the largest private employer in
the United States, with approximately 3,400 stores and more than one million employees.158
The plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart’s policy of giving its mostly male managerial workforce
discretion over pay and promotion decisions allowed biases against women to infect the
decision-making process in ways that disparately impacted women.159 Moreover, given
that Wal-Mart was aware of the effect of its subjective discretion policy but did nothing to
restrict it, women were subject to disparate treatment.160
In their motion for class certification, the plaintiffs provided statistical data showing that
women filled 65% of the hourly jobs at Wal-Mart, but constituted only 33% of management,
with diminishing numbers farther up the ranks.161 In certifying the plaintiffs as a class, the
district court found that there was sufficient evidence to suggest that this gender disparity
resulted from Wal-Mart’s company-wide, subjective selection process, combined with its
failure to post promotional opportunities.162 With regard to pay, the district court found
“largely uncontested descriptive statistics” that women were paid less than men “in every
region, that pay disparities exist in most job categories, [and] that the salary gap widens
over time.”163 This disparity resulted within a “common feature of subjectivity” in setting
pay across all stores.164
157 Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal 2004)
(No. C-01-2252). The motion for class certification covered all women employed by Wal-Mart at any time
since December 26, 1998. See id. at 141–42.
158

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011).

159

Id. at 2548.

160 Id. at 2548. Disparate treatment claims cover allegations that an employer treats some people differently
on a prohibited basis; disparate impact involves employment practices that are facially neutral, but whose
effects fall more harshly on a protected group. See Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics:
Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 91, 111 (2003).
161

Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 222 F.R.D. 137, 146 (N.D. Cal 2004).

162

Id. at 148–49.

163

Id. at 155.

164

Id. at 148.
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The plaintiffs also provided anecdotal evidence of gender bias through affidavits from
121 class members.165 The district court cited comments by managers such as “[m]en are
here to make a career and women aren’t. Retail is for housewives who just need to earn
extra money,” and “[w]e need you in toys . . . you’re a girl, why do you want to be in
Hardware.”166
The district court further found that Wal-Mart’s uniform, centrally controlled corporate
culture—called the Wal-Mart Way—may reinforce gender stereotypes through training
programs, daily and weekly meetings in which company culture was discussed, promotions
from within existing ranks, movement of store-level managers across stores and districts, and
technological monitoring of all management decisions by the Home Office.167 The district
court accepted the social framework testimony of the plaintiffs’ expert, who explained
how managerial discretion over pay and promotions, exercised within Wal-Mart’s uniform
corporate culture, fostered gender stereotyping, in which managers would “‘seek out and
retain stereotyping-confirming information and ignore or minimize information that defies
stereotypes.’”168 The Ninth Circuit, in a rehearing en banc, upheld the district court’s class
certification decision.169 The Supreme Court subsequently reversed both lower courts.
C. The Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the
commonality requirement for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23 because they could not show that Wal-Mart was motivated by the same reason for
each employment outcome.170 Justice Scalia stated that there was no “common answer to
the crucial question why was I disfavored.”’171 In the Court’s view, a policy of subjective
discretion is not a uniform employment practice that provides the necessary commonality
for class certification.172 Rather, subjective promotion and pay practices are a “very common
165

Id. at 165.

166

Id. at 165–66.

167

Wal-Mart, 222 F.R.D. at 151–54.

168

Id. at 153–54 (quoting declaration of Dr. William Bielby).

169

Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 577 (9th Cir. 2010).

170

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554–56 (2011).

171

Id. at 2552.

172

Id. at 2554.
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and presumptively reasonable way of doing business . . . .”173 Moreover, such subjective
personnel practices could not constitute an official employer policy, because “[i]n a company
of Wal-Mart’s size and geographical scope, it is quite unbelievable that all managers would
exercise their discretion in a common way without some common direction.”174 Under
the Court’s evidentiary standard for establishing commonality, employees must provide
“significant proof” that their employer “operated under a general policy of discrimination .
. . .”175 Subjective personnel policies apparently can no longer satisfy this new standard.176
The opinion reflects many of the failings identified by feminist economists. The
majority surfaced two economic assumptions about discrimination: first, discrimination
is aberrant and arises only when a bad actor intentionally acts upon bias; and second,
the market ensures that discrimination is too inefficient to be widespread. Both of these
assumptions reflect dated thinking about how discrimination operates. In addition, the
majority devalued the care work obligations of women.
D. The Court’s Market Assumptions
Whereas the majority searched in vain for a corporate policy of discrimination,
the dissent, authored by Justice Ginsburg (and joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor,
and Kagan), applied a more nuanced understanding of discrimination.177 Justice Scalia
expressed incredulity that supervisors would choose to discriminate, stating with no
supporting evidence that “left to their own devices most managers in any corporation—and
surely most managers in a corporation that forbids sex discrimination—would select sexneutral, performance-based criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable
disparity at all.”178

173

Id. at 2554.

174

Id. at 2555.

175 Id. at 2553 (quoting General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159, n.15) (internal
quotations omitted). The Court also rejected plaintiff’s statistical evidence, id. at 2555, and the testimony about
social framework, id. at 2553–54.
176 Michael J. Zimmer, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Taking the Protection Out of Protected Classes, 16 Lewis &
Clark L. Rev. 409 (2012) (predicting that although the case was decided on procedural grounds, it portends
changes in substantive Title VII law that will harm employees).
177

Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.

178

Id. at 2554.
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He is not alone: “Many individuals resist recognizing the existence of pervasively
unfair group-based outcomes, as doing so would challenge the widely held and deep-seated
belief that the world is just and that outcomes are based on personal control, meritocracies,
and fairness.”179 The Court majority—and indeed the general public—remains wedded to
the American myth of meritocracy, in which a free market rewards the deserving based on
hard work and skill.180 This belief system has deep psychological roots that make people
reluctant to attribute bad outcomes to discrimination.181 The meritocracy myth misses the
huge impact of non-merit factors on individual success, such as inheritance (or the class
position from which one starts out in life), educational opportunities, and discrimination.182
Nevertheless, the myth and its economic underpinnings animate much of the majority’s
viewpoints about discrimination. This viewpoint reinforces, rather than balances, existing
power dynamics in favor of business owners.
By contrast, Justice Ginsburg did not ascribe to or require an “evil” motive on the part
of employers to find discrimination.183 Rather, she understands that discrimination can be
unintentional. As she stated, “The practice of delegating to supervisors large discretion
to make personnel decisions, uncontrolled by formal standards, has long been known to
have the potential to produce disparate effects. Managers, like all humankind, may be prey
to biases of which they are unaware.”184 Justice Ginsburg was referring to the process of
cognitive, or unconscious, bias. As she stated, “The risk of discrimination is heightened
when . . . managers are predominantly of one sex, and are steeped in a corporate culture
that perpetuates gender stereotypes.”185
179 Jonah Gelbach et al., Passive Discrimination: When Does It Make Sense to Pay Too Little?, 76 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 797, 841 (2009).
180 Eyer, supra note 145, at 1304; Stephen J. & Robert K. Miller, Jr., The Meritocracy Myth 1–9
(2d ed. 2009). See also Deborah Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 Tex. L.
Rev. 1847, 1852–60 (1996) (describing competing theoretical models regarding the root causes of economic
inequality—economic individualism versus a structural system of inequality).
181 Eyer, supra note 145, at 1299. This psychological phenomenon arises from the tension between
American ideology about meritocracy and attributions of discriminatory conduct, which creates a “threat to
many individuals’ core beliefs.” Id. at 1303, 1308.
182

Stephen J. McNamee & Robert K. Miller, The Meritocracy Myth 243–44 (2009).

183 Justice Ginsburg faced gender discrimination in her own professional life, which likely shaped her view
of how it operates. See Carey Olney, Better Bitch Than Mouse: Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Feminism, and VMI, 9
Buff. Women’s L.J. 97, 103–07 (2000–2001).
184

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2564 (2011).

185

Id. at 2564.
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In the early years after Title VII was passed, employment discrimination was often
blatant and motivated by racial and/or gender animus.186 While overt discrimination still
exists,187 scholars now recognize “second generation” discrimination, which is more
complex and subtle and fueled by unconscious bias.188 Psychologists have shown that
unconscious bias arises from natural and normal cognitive shortcuts that all people use to
simplify and process information.189 These cognitive shortcuts contribute to stereotypes,
which in turn “cause discrimination by biasing how we process information about other
people.”190 Although biases may operate without conscious intent to “favor or disfavor
members of particular groups,” they can nevertheless “bias a decision maker’s judgment
long before the ‘moment of decision’ [when the employment decision in question is made],
as a decision maker attends to relevant data and interprets, encodes, stores, and retrieves it
from memory.”191 In other words, employers expect members of certain groups to behave
in certain ways, and they over-attribute information that confirms their expectations, while
disregarding information that contradicts expectations.192
Stereotyping is particularly likely to occur when evaluative criteria are subjective
because biases can flourish without restraint.193 Indeed, extensive research establishes that
186
See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 (1995); Susan Sturm, Second
Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 459, 459–60 (2001);
Green, supra note 160, at 91, 95–96; Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 40 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 481, 482 (2005).
187 See Selmi, Sex Discrimination, supra note 145, at 4 (asserting that overt workplace discrimination still
persists).
188 See Green supra note 160, at 96–99; Krieger, supra note 186, at 1186–88; Barbara F. Reskin, The
Proximate Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29 Contemp. Soc. 319, 326 (2000) (noting that “I and others
suspect that most employment discrimination originates in the cognitive processes . . . .” ); Sturm, supra note
186, at 468–74. An emerging field of economics called behavioral economics studies how cognitive bias and
other psychological phenomena impact decision-making in ways ignored by neoclassical economics. See The
Behavioral Economics Guide 2015 (Alain Samson ed., 2015), http://www.behavioraleconomics.com/thebehavioral-economics-guide-2015/ [https://perma.cc/HUQ8-7WZJ].
189

See Krieger, supra note 186, at 1187, 1199; Lee, supra note 186, at 482.

190

Krieger, supra note 186, at 1199.

191

Id. at 1187–88.

192

Id. at 1198.

193 See Lee, supra note 186, at 484, 487–88; Tristin K. Green & Alexandra Kalev, Discrimination-Reducing
Measures at the Relational Level, 59 Hastings L.J. 1435, 1444 (2008); Barbara F. Reskin & Debra B. McBrier,
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subjective, discretionary personnel practices contribute to pay disparities.194 Despite these
modern understandings of discrimination, Justice Scalia was wedded to old-fashioned
notions that focus solely on an employer’s state of mind rather than on how unconscious
bias interacts with organizational structures to allow unchecked stereotypes to determine
employment outcomes.195 In so doing, he left undisturbed existing power relationships.
Justice Scalia’s statement that managers will normally render sex-neutral decisions rests
on a belief that the market generally cures discrimination, which, when it happens, is the
result of deviant outliers. In this law and economics viewpoint, discrimination is inefficient,
and therefore, the market will punish and eliminate bad actors that discriminate.196 Law and
economics scholars posit that competition for consumers and workers either has or will
drive out discrimination, as will employers’ increasing experience with women workers and
resulting knowledge about their abilities and performance.197 However, as Lesley Wexler
has thoroughly explained in the context of the Wal-Mart case, there are many reasons why
these neoclassical economic assumptions falter in the context of Wal-Mart. She explains
how Wal-Mart can be ruthless in its pursuit of profits through low prices and high volume
sales, yet still fail to implement nondiscriminatory pay and promotion practices.198
Wexler highlights three key factors. First, workers have limited leverage at WalMart because Wal-Mart is not concerned about worker quality or exit costs, and because
workers lack comparative information about pay.199 Second, Wal-Mart has limited market
competition for workers; indeed, it is bigger than its next six competitors and thus drives
Why Not Ascription? Organizations’ Employment of Male and Female Managers, 65 Am. Soc. Rev. 210, 214
(2000). Scholars note that employers can take concrete measures to counteract stereotypes and bias. See Lee,
supra note 186, at 486. In other words, cognitive bias is not insurmountable.
194 See Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes: Lessons for the Legal Quest for Equal
Pay, 46 New Eng. L. Rev. 229, 256 (2012).
195 As Professor Michael Selmi commented, “[t]he irony in the Court’s position should be apparent: it
can see discrimination only in its most blatant forms but everything we know about discrimination suggests
that contemporary discrimination looks very different.” Michael Selmi, The Evolution of Employment
Discrimination Law: Changed Doctrine for Changed Social Conditions, 2014 Wis. L. Rev. 937, 992 (2014)
[hereinafter Selmi, Evolution].
196
See generally Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment
Discrimination Laws 34 (1992).
197

Lesley Wexler, Wal-Mart Matters, 46 Wake Forest L. Rev. 95, 112–13 (2011).

198

Id. at 99–101

199

Id. at 114–16.
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down market wages.200 Third, as for customers, they have little influence on Wal-Mart’s
employment practices due to their lack of knowledge, indifference, or shared beliefs in
the governing stereotypes.201 For all these reasons, Wexler concludes, “highly rational
and efficient companies need not always sacrifice the bottom line in order to maintain a
preference for discrimination.” 202
Wal-Mart may have an official policy against discrimination (although it was actually
late to the game, enacting a policy against harassment only in the mid-1990s),203 but the
Court majority is either hopelessly naïve or purely disingenuous to conclude, as it did,
that this policy determines Wal-Mart’s practices.204 All major employers have similar
policies, as that is the state of the law. However, there is no evidence that official corporate
statements prevent discrimination.205 Overall, the Court places its faith in the market to
“cure” discrimination, and in so doing, it discounts other values, such as women’s desire to
be treated fairly without the burdens of gender stereotyping.
E. Devaluation of Care Work
The majority also failed to recognize how many women at Wal-Mart fell victim to
caregiver discrimination, also known as family responsibility discrimination.206 This
stereotype holds that because women are—and should be—the primary caretakers for their
children, they are less likely to prioritize work and to therefore succeed in the workplace.207
200

Id. at 117.

201

Id. at 118–19.

202

Id. at 121.

203

Wexler, supra note 197, at 110–11.

204 See Selmi, Evolution, supra note 195, at 991. See also Moss, supra note 153, at 20–23 (noting that most
employers have boilerplate anti-discrimination policies, which can be purely symbolic shams, but that courts
nevertheless accept them as evidence of non-discrimination).
205 See Moss, supra note 153, at 23 (“The worse discriminators therefore have the greatest incentive to
adopt the best-sounding EEO polices.”).
206 See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are
Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 Harv. Women’s L.J. 77, 90–94 (2003) (“designing workplaces around
men’s traditional bodies and life patterns discriminates against women and male caregivers.”); Joan C. Williams
& Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”: Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments
in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59 Hastings L.J. 1311, 1313 (2008).
207

See Williams & Bornstein, supra note 206, at 1326.
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The record in the Wal-Mart case was laden with examples of statements reflecting this bias,
such as a male manager who stated that “women should be home barefoot and pregnant”; a
female employee who was told to resign and “find a husband to settle down with and have
children”; and a supervisor who asked for the resignation of the only female store manager
in her district because she “needed to be home raising [her] daughter” instead of managing
a store.208 Justice Ginsburg acknowledged the pervasiveness of this stereotype, explaining
that Wal-Mart’s policy of requiring relocation as a condition for promotions created a risk
that “managers will act on the familiar assumption that women, because of their services
to husband and children, are less mobile than men.”209 This could lead management to pass
over women willing to move, or to enforce a policy that harms women who cannot relocate
as members of dual-earner families, with no concomitant productivity benefit.210 Ginsburg
sees that supposedly “natural” or “inevitable” market outcomes that disadvantage women
are actually the result of stereotyped thinking put into action. She thus argues that society
needs to support care work rather than punish women for their care obligations.
F. Impact
The immediate impact of the Wal-Mart decision was that the 1.5 million plaintiffs did
not get the relief they were seeking. Instead, they had to go back to the drawing board to
redesign their lawsuit, and they did so, filing a series of smaller class action complaints
limited by geographical region, although there has been little success to date due to court
denials of class certification and statute of limitations bars.211
208 The National Women’s Law Center collected these examples, which were taken from the Joint Appendix
submitted to the Supreme Court by the litigants in Wal-Mart v. Dukes. Wal-Mart v. Dukes—Why the Supreme
Court Should Stand With Working Women, Nat’l Women’s L. Ctr. (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.nwlc.org/
resource/wal-mart-v-dukes-why-supreme-court-should-stand-working-women
[https://perma.cc/HP23VUUW].
209

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2563 (2011).

210 See Wexler, supra note 197, at 109–10; Naomi Schoenbaum, The Family and the Market at Wal-Mart, 62
DePaul L. Rev. 759, 765–66 (2013). The record showed that there were other stereotypes at play at Wal-Mart
as well, including the stereotype that women are not their families’ primary breadwinners and that therefore,
higher-paying positions should go to men, and the assumption that men and women prefer and are better at
gender-defined roles. See Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and National Women’s
Law Center, et al., In Support of Respondents, at 16–24, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Dukes (2011) (No. 10-277),
2011 WL 805231.
211 See Scott Flaherty, 3 Years After Dukes, Employees Struggle in Wal-Mart Cases, Law 360 (July 17,
2014),
http://www.law360.com/articles/558047/3-years-after-dukes-employees-struggle-in-wal-mart-cases
[https://perma.cc/RJ9W-6KJN].
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One investigative study found that in the aftermath of the decision, “[j]ury verdicts
have been overturned, settlements thrown out, and class actions rejected or decertified,
in many instances undoing years of litigation. The rulings have come in every part of
the country, in lawsuits involving all types of companies.”212 The study found that fewer
employment discrimination class action cases are being filed, and settlement amounts have
plummeted from $346 million for the biggest ten cases in 2010 to $45 million in 2012.213
In short, Wal-Mart v. Dukes has tipped the litigation balance strongly in favor of employers
over employees.214 The case has clearly impacted the availability of large class actions
challenging employment practices.
The case has also left employment discrimination law in flux, particularly as applied to
second generation claims challenging subjective employment practices.215 These forms of
discrimination operate “less as a blanket policy or discrete, identifiable decision to exclude
than as a perpetual tug on opportunity and advancement.”216 The majority’s ruling means
that discretionary employment practices cannot provide the basis for a common claim in
a class action lawsuit.217 The result may be an increase of gender-based pay disparities
in the workplace, due to the Court’s presumption that subjective personnel practices are
reasonable.218 In fact, employers may now have a perverse incentive to maintain subjective
practices without centralized oversight as a way of evading Title VII liability. And, given
Wal-Mart’s dominant status in the marketplace, other employers may be encouraged to

212 Nina Martin, The Impact and Echoes of the Wal-Mart Discrimination Case, ProPublica (Sept. 27,
2013), http://www.propublica.org/article/the-impact-and-echoes-of-the-wal-mart-discrimination-case [https://
perma.cc/7QS7-96FM].
213

Id.

214
See Malveaux, supra note 156, at 35, 52; Katherine E. Lamm, Work on Progress: Civil
Rights Class Actions After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 50 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 153 (2015) (surveying
impact of the case on future class actions and making recommendations to litigators). Cf. Elizabeth
Tippett, Robbing A Barren Vault: The Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart for Cases Challenging Subjective
Employment Practices, 29 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 433 (2012) (arguing that the case’s effect will be less
dramatic than some predict).
215 See Zimmer, supra note 176, at 460; Eisenberg, supra note 194, at 157; Malveaux, supra note 156, at
44; Selmi, Evolution, supra note 195, at 941.
216

Melissa Hart, Learning From Wal-Mart, 10 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 355, 376 (2006).

217

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553, 2556 (2011).

218

Eisenberg, supra note 194, at 257.
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follow their model.219 For all these reasons, scholars have been looking for other Title VII
theories, alternate employment statutes, and other statutory models to frame claims, as
well as non-litigation alternatives, such as structural reform of workplace practices and
employer compliance programs.220
III. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
A. The Economics of Contraception
Decades of research establish that contraception access directly fosters women’s
economic well-being by helping women control the size of their families and the timing of
childrearing.221 In turn, this control allows women to make educational and employment
decisions that benefit themselves and the broader society.222 The Supreme Court has
previously acknowledged the importance of reproductive autonomy, stating in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, “the ability of women to participate
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to
control their reproductive lives.”223
219

Id.

220 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 194, at 262–70 (advocating for bringing discrimination claims under the
Equal Pay Act); Tristin K. Green, Civil Rights Lemonade: Title VII, Gender, and Working Options for Working
Families, 10 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 191, 213–15 (2014) (advocating for the need to expand working options for
families); Melissa Hart, The Possibility of Avoiding Discrimination: Considering Compliance and Liability, 39
Conn. L. Rev. 1623, 1635–44 (2007) (advocating for employer-based compliance practices); Reinsch & Goltz,
supra note 156, at 289–300 (advocating for a fraud on the market approach taken from securities cases); Sturm,
supra note 186, at 522–37 (advocating for a regulatory approach involving multiple intermediaries).
221 Adam Sonfield et al., The Social and Economic Benefits of Women’s Ability to Determine Whether and
When to Have Children, Guttmacher Inst. 3 (Mar. 2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/social-economicbenefits.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9YZ-CUJ4] [hereinafter Sonfield et al., Social and Economic Benefits]. Indeed,
in a major survey, 77% of women who used birth control reported that it allowed them to better care for
themselves and their families, while large majorities also reported that birth control allowed them to support
themselves financially (71%), stay in school (64%), and help them obtain and maintain employment (64%).
See Colleen Connell, Lorie Chaiten, & Richard Muniz, Religious Refusals Under the Affordable Care Act:
Contraception as Essential Health Care, 15 DePaul J. Health Care L. 1, 5 (2013).
222

Connell, et al., supra note 221, at 5.

223 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992). Unfortunately, Casey has failed to
protect women’s reproductive choices because the courts have given little teeth to the undue burden standard.
See Linda J. Wharton & Kathryn Kolbert, Preserving Roe v. Wade . . . When You Win Only Half the Loaf, 24
Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 143, 144–45, 156 (2013). As a result, states have enacted many abortion restrictions,
such as waiting periods and onerous licensing regimes, which in turn put abortion out of reach for many
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Notably, since the Supreme Court established contraception as a fundamental right
in 1965, the percentage of women participating in the workforce has more than doubled
to around 60% of women.224 Moreover, access to contraception has contributed to
approximately one-third of women’s wage gains since the mid-twentieth century.225 The
advent of available birth control has also lead to dramatic increases in the numbers of
women in college and in formerly male-dominated professions such as medicine, dentistry,
law, and business.226 Contraception also supports women’s health and that of their children.
It can limit the health risks involved in pregnancy,227 which are compounded for unintended
or narrowly-spaced pregnancies.228
For all these reasons, over 99% of sexually active American women between fifteen
and forty-four have used birth control.229 Nevertheless, about half of all annual pregnancies
are unintended, amounting to 2.8 million births, and of these, about half result from the
14% of women using no form of contraception.230 One contributing factor to unintended
women. Id. at 157–58. As this Article was going to press, the Supreme Court struck down Texas abortion
regulations requiring that abortion facilities meet the standards for ambulatory surgical centers and that doctors
performing abortions have admitting privileges at nearby hospitals; these requirements dramatically reduced
the availability of abortion services in Texas. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. __ (2016). The
ruling was 5-3 (Justice Scalia’s seat remains open as of the date of the decision). This decision—along with
its future application to numerous similar regulations around the country—will improve the economic security
of millions of women given the links between reproductive health access and economic stability. See Michele
Gilman, How Limiting Women’s Access to Birth Control and Abortions Hurts the Economy, Huffington Post
(Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/the-conversation-us/how-limiting-womens-acces_b_9796032.
html [https://perma.cc/6WC8-FSXT].
224

Connell et al., supra note 221, at 6.

225

Id.; see Sonfield et al., Social and Economic Benefits, supra note 221, at 14.

226 Connell et al., supra note 221, at 5–6; Sonfield, et al., Social and Economic Benefits, supra note 221, at
7–8, 11.
227 Connell et al., supra note 221, at 1 (“out of every 100,000 births in the United States, 12.7 women die
as a result of pregnancy-related complications”).
228 Id. at 4. In addition, “women experiencing unintended pregnancy are at increased risk for depression,
anxiety, and other mental health conditions. Furthermore, unintended pregnancy increases a woman’s risk of
experiencing domestic violence and marital strain.” Id. at 5.
229 Kimberly Daniels, Williams Mosher & Jo Jones, Contraceptive Methods Women Have Ever Used:
United States, 1982–2010, 62 Nat’l Health Stat. Rep. (2013), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr062.
pdf [https://perma.cc/NLX9-XJX7].
230 Fact Sheet: Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, Guttmacher Inst. (May 2016), https://www.
guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/factsheet/fb-unintended-pregnancy-us_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/62RR-YU22].
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pregnancy is the cost of birth control, particularly for the most effective, long-lasting
forms.231 For instance, the cost of an IUD equals a month’s full-time pay for a minimum
wage worker.232 Thus, it turns out that only one-fourth of women who request an IUD go
through with insertion after they find out the cost, which can exceed $1,000 for the device
and medical procedure. Overall, almost one-third of women report that they would change
their contraceptive method if cost were not a factor.233 These costs are significant, given
that the average American woman wants two children, and thus she will need contraception
for at least three decades of her life.234 The cost barrier is compounded for low-income
women, who have five times the unintended pregnancy rate of women with incomes above
200% the poverty line.235 Unfortunately, publicly funded family planning meets only 54%
of the need.236 Not surprisingly, health insurance makes a difference, and women with
coverage are much more likely to use contraceptive care.237
B. Background of the Case
The myriad of health and economic benefits associated with contraceptive access
231
Gina M. Secura et al., The Contraceptive CHOICE Project: Reducing Barriers to Long-Acting
Reversible Contraception, 203 Am. J. Obstetrics & Gynecology 115 (2010), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC2910826/ [https://perma.cc/BM8J-TBCL]. “Reasons for lack of use [of long-acting forms
of contraception] include women’s knowledge of and attitudes towards the methods, practice patterns among
providers, and high initial up-front cost associated with these methods.” Id. at 116.
232 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2800 n.22 (2014). See also David Eisenberg,
Colleen McNicholas & Jeffrey F. Peipert, Cost as a Barrier to Long-Acting Reversible Contraceptive (LARC)
Use in Adolescents, 52 J. Adolescent Health S59, S60 (2013), http://www.jahonline.org/article/S1054139X(13)00054-2/fulltext [https://perma.cc/Q6WZ-42CV] (“The total bill for a patient to initiate a LARC
method generally exceeds $1000.”).
233 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2800 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (summarizing research); Su-Ying Liang et
al., Women’s Out-of-Pocket Expenditures and Dispensing Patterns for Oral Contraceptive Pills Between 1996
and 2006, 83 Contraception 528, 531 (2011).
234 Guttmacher Inst., Fulfilling the Promise: Public Policy and U.S. Family Planning Clinics 10
(2000), https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fulfill.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6SN-HKN2].
235 Sonfield et al., Social and Economic Benefits, supra note 221, at 4; Kara Loewentheil, When Free
Exercise Is a Burden: Protecting “Third Parties” in Religious Accommodation Law, 62 Drake L. Rev. 433,
441 (2014).
236

Sonfield et al., Social and Economic Benefits, supra note 221, at 30.

237
See Adam Sonfield, Contraception: An Integral Component of Preventative Care for Women,
Guttmacher Pol’y Rev. 6–7 (Spring 2010), https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/13/2/gpr130202.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E9JF-9K38].
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explain why the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) covers birth control. Under the ACA,
employers with fifty or more full-time employees must offer “a group health plan or group
health insurance coverage” that provides “minimum essential coverage.”238 Initial drafts of
the ACA did not cover women’s preventive services, prompting Senator Barbara Mikulski
to introduce the Women’s Health Amendment in order to counter gender discrimination
in the health insurance market and “to guarantee women access to preventive health
care screenings and care at no cost.”239 The Amendment passed, and is part of the ACA.
Meanwhile (and relevant to the Hobby Lobby case), Congress defeated a proposed
“conscience amendment” that would have allowed employers to deny certain forms of
coverage based on religious beliefs.240
Pursuant to the ACA, employer group health plans must provide “preventive care
and screenings” for women,241 defined as the “full range” of FDA-approved contraceptive
methods, as well as patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive
capacity.242 By prohibiting patient cost sharing, the ACA “brought with it the potential to
eliminate cost as a reason for choosing one method of contraception over another, a change
238

26 U.S.C. 5000A(f)(2) (2010); 4980H(a), (c)(2) (2010).

239 Press Release, Senator Barbara A. Mikulski, Mikulski Puts Women First in Health Care Reform Debate
(Nov. 30, 2009), http://www.lb7.uscourts.gov/documents/12-384119.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UWE-XM4X]
[hereinafter Mikulski Press Release]. As she explained, “[w]omen are often confronted by the punitive
practices of insurance companies. We face gender discrimination. We pay more and get less . . . . ” Id. On the
legislative history of the contraceptive requirements of the ACA, see generally Rose Shingledecker, Note, No
Good Deed: The Impropriety of the Religious Accommodation of Contraceptive Coverage Requirements in the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 47 Ind. L. Rev. 301, 301–04 (2014).
240 See, e.g., N.C. Aizenman & Rosalind S. Helderman, Birth Control Exemption Bill, the ‘Blunt amendment,’
Killed in Senate, Wash. Post (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/birthcontrol-exemption-bill-the-blunt-amendment-killed-in-senate/2012/03/01/gIQA4tXjkR_ story.html [https://
perma.cc/GB4M-NA97].
241 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(4) (2010). The ACA directs that HFRA define “preventive care and screenings.”
Id. HRFA is a unit of HHS.
242 HHS adopted the recommendation of the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”), an independent non-profit
group of medical experts created by Congress in 1980 to advise the government on medical issues. See Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014) (describing the legislative history). Inst. of Med.,
Clinical Preventive Services for Women: Closing the Gaps 103–04 (2011). The guidelines are at 77 Fed.
Reg. 8725–26 (Feb. 10, 2012). Under these guidelines, employers must provide coverage without cost sharing
for “all Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient
education and counseling.” These guidelines include well-woman visits, screening for gestational diabetes,
breastfeeding support and counseling, and screening and counseling for interpersonal and domestic violence.
77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 10, 2012) (internal brackets omitted).
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that could be particularly important for low-income women and women considering
methods with substantial upfront costs.”243
C. The Majority Opinion
Almost immediately after passage of the ACA, litigation over the contraceptive
mandate began.244 Over one hundred lawsuits were filed to challenge the contraceptive
coverage requirement, and suits by three for-profit, closely-held corporations eventually
reached the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on the
issue.245 These plaintiffs contended (incorrectly) that certain forms of contraception, such
as IUDs and emergency contraception, act as abortifacients,246 and thus complying with
the contraception requirement would force them to facilitate abortions in violation of their
religious beliefs. In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff corporations
and ruled that the contraception mandate violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993 (“RFRA”)247 because it substantially burdens the exercise of religion and is not
the least restrictive means for the government to achieve its objective.248 Hobby Lobby is
the first case in which the “Court recognized a for-profit corporation’s qualification for a
religious exemption from a generally applicable law . . . .”249
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Alito and joined by Justices Roberts, Scalia,
Thomas, and Kennedy (in concurrence) reasoned that corporations were “persons” who
243 Adam Sonfield et al., Impact of the Federal Contraceptive Coverage Guarantee on Out-of-Pocket
Payments for Contraceptives: 2014 Update, 91 Contraception 44, 44 (2014), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC4712914/ [https://perma.cc/DUP5-D4HN] [hereinafter Sonfield et al., Impact].
244

See Loewenthiel, supra note 235, at 449.

245

See id.

246 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. For an explanation of why contraceptives are not abortifacients,
see Priscilla J. Smith, Contraceptive Comstockery: Reasoning from Immorality to Illness in the Twenty-First
Century, 47 Conn. L. Rev. 971, 1012–17 (2015).
247

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)-(b) (1993).

248 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. RFRA states: “The Government shall not substantially burden a
person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.” 42 USC. § 2000bb1(a). A governmental burden is allowed only if it “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” Id. at 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb-1(b).
249

Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

32.1

Columbia Journal of Gender and Law

39

can engage in the “exercise of religion.”250 The Court concluded that the contraception
mandate substantially burdened the plaintiffs’ religious belief that life begins at conception
by forcing them to either violate their religious beliefs or to face large statutory penalties if
they refused to cover contraception or dropped their group health plans altogether.251 The
Court assumed for the purposes of argument that the government had a compelling interest
in enacting the mandate,252 but held that these governmental interests could be served with
a less restrictive alternative; that is, the government could cover the contraception itself
or it could adopt the same accommodation it extends to religious non-profits by requiring
insurance carriers to provide this coverage separately.253 As to the latter option, however,
the Court conceded that it might not comply with RFRA “for purposes of all religious
claims.”254
D. The Court’s Market Assumptions
The case obviously presents sharp divisions among the Justices about the scope of
RFRA and its protections for religious beliefs. The case also reveals major differences
underlying the Justices’ assumptions about the market and its relationship to gender
equality. The Hobby Lobby majority reinforced the primacy of corporations over the
interests of employees and the general public. In so doing, the majority overturned a
legislative solution intended to correct for a market imperfection that resulted from sex
discrimination, i.e., a lack of accessible preventive care for all female employees. The
majority opinion repeatedly emphasized the importance of the “the religious liberty of
the humans who own and control those companies.”255 Justice Alito spun detailed and
heartwarming origin stories of the plaintiffs Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood Specialties,
as family-run companies founded by men and run today mostly by their sons.256 Women
250

Id. at 2768–70.

251

Id. at 2775–76.

252

Id. at 2780.

253 Id. at 2781–82. Religious non-profit organizations that oppose providing contraception coverage can opt
out through a certification process, and their employees’ health insurance company must provide coverage at
its own cost. 45 § C.F.R. 147.131 (2015).
254

Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct at 2782.

255

Id. at 2768.

256 Id. at 2764 (Conestoga Wood Specialties was founded by Norman Hahn and one of his sons is the
president and CEO); Id. at 2765 (David Green founded Hobby Lobby and one of his sons started an affiliated
business).
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were mentioned only as co-owners of the companies via their status as wives and mothers,
with no corporate responsibilities.257 The elaborate description of the plaintiff corporations
is entirely male-oriented and once again reinforces the primacy and power of business
interests over that of workers.
Indeed, the Court paid scant attention to the interests of the anonymous female
employees. Hobby Lobby has 13,000 employees, many of which are women and many
of whom have female dependents. As Justice Ginsburg stated in her dissent, which was
joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Breyer, the majority’s decision denies “legions
of women who do not hold their employers’ beliefs access to contraceptive coverage that
the ACA would otherwise secure.”258 In her view, the autonomous health care decisions
of women, made in consultation with their doctors, outweigh the beliefs of a handful of
corporate owners.259 At the end of the day, “[w]orking for Hobby Lobby or Conestoga .
. . should not deprive employees of the preventive care available to workers at the shop
next door, at least in the absence of directions from the Legislature or Administration to
do so.”260 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg explained that the burden on the corporations in
complying with the ACA is minimal, especially since for-profit corporations do not have to
buy or provide contraceptives, but rather, “to direct money into undifferentiated funds that
finance a wide variety of benefits under comprehensive health plans.”261
Not only did the majority provide uplifting descriptions of the plaintiff corporations,
but it also waxed rhapsodic about the virtues of for-profit corporations. Corporations often
“support a wide variety of charitable causes . . . [and] further humanitarian and other
altruistic objectives.”262 Some corporations may even “take costly pollution-control and
energy-conservation measures that go beyond what the law requires . . . [and] may exceed
the requirements of local law regarding working conditions and benefits.” Yet while many
corporations act admirably, other corporations damage the environment, discriminate
257 In fact, the Greens have a daughter who serves a vice president of art and creative, although she is not
named or identified as such in the Court opinion. See Brief for Respondents at 8, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13–354).
258 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2790. See also id. at 2787 (pointing to the interests of the “thousands of
women employed by Hobby Lobby and Conestoga or dependents of persons those corporations employ”).
259

Id. at 2799.

260

Id. at 2804.

261

Id. at 2799.

262

Id. at 2771.
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against workers, lie about the safety of their products, engage in illegal monopolies, and
so forth. The majority’s rosy and optimistic view of corporations is consistent with its
expansion of corporate personhood into new domains.263
By comparison, the majority was clearly not impressed with the government’s
espoused interests in “public health” and “gender equality,” which it dismissed as “very
broad.”264 The majority simply did not deem contraception as essential to women’s
economic equality, evidently assuming that unhappy Hobby Lobby employees can leave
and get other jobs with better benefits. In other words, the market should cure this ill.
The Court’s dismissive attitude towards women’s reproductive health is exactly why the
ACA covers contraception. The ACA remedies a gap in our public health and insurance
system, which has long been designed around the needs of the male norm, while using
women’s reproductive differences as a basis for discrimination.265 Prior to the ACA, there
were numerous health plans that covered Viagra, a drug to help men enjoy their sex lives,
while denying women contraception, a method essential for women to not only have
healthy sexual lives, but also to make decisions about childrearing.266 Equality means more
than “rooting out discriminatory treatment of similarly situated women and men”; it must
“assure that implicitly male norms of the reproductive role are not unreflectively accepted
as the measure of equality, thereby disadvantaging most women.”267 The Hobby Lobby
majority has a robust view of equality for corporations, but none for women. Denying
women access to contraception tells women that their concerns and need for control over
their own destinies and economic well-being do not matter and that they are second-class
citizens.268
Justice Ginsburg rejected the majority’s characterization of the government’s interests,
263 See generally Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 4 Utah L. Rev. 1629 (2011);
Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and Corporate Personhood in
Citizens United, 61 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 497 (2010).
264

Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2799.

265 Cornelia T. Pillard, Our Other Reproductive Choices: Equality in Sex Education, Contraceptive Access,
and Work-Family Policy, 56 Emory L.J. 941, 964 (2007).
266

Id. at 967.

267

Id. at 977.

268 Id. at 976. See also Douglas Nejaime & Reva Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience
Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 Yale L.J. 2516, 2574–78 (2015) (describing the dignity harms from
complicity-based conscience claims).
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discussing at length the rationale underlying the ACA’s preventive services coverage for
women, and citing to extensive data, research, and expert recommendations. She argued
that the government’s interests were “concrete, specific, and demonstrated by a wealth of
empirical evidence,” regarding the health benefits of contraception in avoiding unintended
pregnancies, reducing the risks to those for whom pregnancy can be dangerous, and treating
non-pregnancy related health conditions.269 Notably, the only data wielded by the majority
related to the amount of fines facing corporations who refuse to provide ACA coverage,
which it deemed substantial. While the majority focused on fines, Justice Ginsburg noted
that the corporation’s proposed alternative—a tax credit for employees—does “nothing
for the woman too poor to be aided by a tax credit.”270 In so doing, she highlighted her
awareness of the class differences among women and their differential access to health
care. She further noted that the decision has no limiting principle: “Suppose an employer’s
sincerely held religious belief is offended by health coverage of vaccines, or paying the
minimum wage, or according women equal pay for substantially similar work?”271
In sum, the majority imbued corporations with personhood and painted them as
beneficent actors while rejecting any legislative interference in corporate decision-making.
As for gender, the majority reinforced historical patterns of gender inequality based on
male norms of health needs. By contrast, the dissent, written by Justice Ginsburg, viewed
the market as imperfect, and the legislative fix in the ACA as essential to meet the health
and economic needs of women.
E. Impact
For the millions of women outside the scope of the Hobby Lobby ruling, the contraceptive
coverage guaranteed in the ACA is making a substantial and beneficial impact by eliminating
out-of-pocket costs. For instance, between fall 2012 and spring 2014, one study showed
that the proportion of users of the pill (oral contraception) who were paying zero dollars
out of pocket increased from 15% to 67%, with similar increases for women using longterm forms of contraception.272 Another study showed that women saved approximately
$1.4 billion on birth control pills as a result of the ACA.273 Yet due to Hobby Lobby, there
269

Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2799.

270

Id. at 2803.

271

Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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Sonfield, et al., Impact, supra note 243, at 46–47.
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is a large cadre of women employed by closely-held corporations whose access is more
limited. In July 2015, HHS issued a rule allowing closely-held corporations (as defined
by federal tax law) to seek a religious accommodation that exempts them from providing
contraceptive coverage and transfers that obligation to insurance companies. It is likely
that some closely-held corporations will object to the accommodation, as have numerous
religious non-profits, claiming that even filing the necessary paperwork infringes on
their religious rights.274 Even with the accommodation for religious non-profits, there is a
“complete dearth of information” as to whether or not insurance plans are providing this
coverage for employees.275 In addition, a different presidential administration may rescind
the executive branch accommodation and thereby deny women certain forms of
contraceptive coverage.276
IV. Harris v. Quinn
A. The Economics of Caregiving
Everyone needs care at some point in life, whether during childhood, in coping with a
disability, as a frail senior citizen, or some combination of these life phases.277 Simply put,
Penn Medicine Study Finds, Penn Med. (July 7, 2015), http://www.uphs.upenn.edu/news/News_
Releases/2015/07/becker/ [https://perma.cc/KXR9-H2AE].
274 In Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1560 (2016), the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the issue
to the courts of appeals, ruling that the “parties on remand should be afforded an opportunity to arrive at an
approach going forward that accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that
women covered by petitioners’ health plans ‘receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive
coverage.’”
275 Sonfield et al., Impact, supra note 243, at 47. Separate from the religious accommodation issue, there
are still insurers who are not providing the legally required contraceptive services required by the ACA. See
Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr., State of Women’s Coverage: Health Plan Violations of the Affordable
Care Act (2015), http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/stateofcoverage2015final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
X6GN-GQPN].
276 Another contraceptive coverage gap exists due to the Court’s decision in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus’s.
v. Sebelius, in which the Court overturned a provision of the ACA requiring states to expand their Medicaid
programs to cover Americans with income up to 138% of the federal poverty level. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus’s.
v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012); 42 U.S.C.§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2015). States that chose not
expanding Medicaid are leaving millions of low-income women without affordable insurance. Sonfield et al.,
Impact, supra note 243.
277 Nancy Folbre & Erik Olin Wright, Defining Care, in For Love and Money: Care Provision in the
United States [hereinafter For Love and Money] 1, 10 (Nancy Folbre ed., 2012).
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everyone is vulnerable and faces times of dependency.278 Despite the importance of their
task, domestic workers generally toil long hours for little pay and few, if any, benefits, and
suffer social isolation and high rates of physical injuries.279 Nevertheless, due in part to the
growth of Medicaid and Medicare, along with a growing senior population,280 care work is
one of the fastest growing occupations in America, as it “cannot be offshored.”281 According
to the Department of Labor, there are two million workers providing home care to the
elderly and the disabled, such as personal care aides, certified nursing assistants, and
home health aides.282 Ninetey percent of domestic workers are women, while one-third are
African-American; one-fifth are Hispanic; and one-fifth are immigrants.283 Eighty percent
live below the poverty line.284
Domestic worker union organizing has been effective in improving pay and work
conditions for care workers.285 It is also a rare bright spot in the overall decline of unions.
Unionization campaigns for domestic workers began in the 1970s and 1980s with “roots
in the welfare rights movement and the dynamic growth in hospital and health care

278 Eileen Boris & Jennifer Klein, Caring for America: Home Health Care Workers in the Shadow
of the Welfare State 17 (2012); Martha Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition, 20 Yale J.L. & Feminism, 1, 8–9 (2008).
279 Candace Howes, Carrie Leana, & Kristin Smith, Paid Care Work, in For Love and Money, supra
note 277, at 65, 83–86, 180. They earn less money than workers with similar characteristics in other fields. Id.
at 71–72. See also Janie Chuang, Achieving Accountability for Migrant Domestic Worker Abuse, 88 N.C. L.
Rev. 1627, 1632 (“[D]omestic workers in general remain among the most exploited and abused workers in the
world.”).
280 Folbre & Wright, supra note 277, at 10; Nancy Folbre, Valuing Care, in For Love and Money, supra
note 277, at 92; Howes et al., supra note 279, at 70.
281 Boris & Klein, supra note 278, at 6. Domestic work encompasses a variety of occupations, including
child care workers and adult care workers. See Howes et al., supra note 279, at 67–69.
282 Minimum Wage, Overtime Protections Extended to Direct Care Workers by US Labor Department, U.S.
Dep’t Lab. (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/whd/WHD20131922.htm [https://perma.cc/
E6QE-G7GV].
283 Sheila Bapat, Part of the Family? Nannies, Housekeepers, Caregivers and the Battle for
Domestic Workers’ Rights 129 (2014); Folbre & Wright, supra note 277, at 7.
284

Howes et al., supra note 279, at 74.

285 In general, unionization raises women’s pay by 12.9%. John Schmitt & Nicole Woo, Ctr. for
Econ. & Policy Research, Women Workers and Unions, 2 (2013), http://www.cepr.net/documents/unionwomen-2013-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/8896-89FL].
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unionism.”286 Moreover, because care workers are in a relationship with both the state and
individual consumers, unions mobilized on multiple fronts, from organizing clients and
communities, to pressuring state governments, to connecting with other service workers.287
Victories included California’s 1992 adoption of a law that created a legal employment
relationship between home care workers and the state for collective bargaining purposes.288
California’s law led to both reductions in the poverty rate and lower turnover for home care
workers in California.289 Other states have also codified collective bargaining rights for
publicly paid home care workers.290 These successes were due to “coalition politics [that]
opened up a space for the self-activity and politicization of tens of thousands of low-wage
women.”291
Today, the rate of unionization for adult care workers is 13%, which is higher than the
average for all workers, but lower than the rate for other health care professionals.292 By
2010, over 400,000 care workers had joined unions.293 In the service sector, unionization
is estimated to generate a 10.1% wage premium, amounting to about $2.00 per hour,
and unionized home care aids and home health aides earn higher salaries than their nonunionized counterparts.294 This is an important counterbalance to the 6% wage penalty
associated with care work.295 Yet collective bargaining remains absent in most states and at
the federal level,296 and the domestic worker rights movement faces ongoing pushback.297
286

Boris & Klein, supra note 278, at 16.

287

Id. at 16–17.

288 Bapat, supra note 283, at 131–32; Boris & Klein, supra note 278, at 184–86. See also id. at 149–81
(describing union organizing and accomplishments in the 1980s despite Reagan era pushback).
289

Bapat, supra note 283, at 132.

290 Id.; Boris & Klein, supra note 278, at 214–15 (these states include Oregon, Washington, Illinois,
Massachusetts, and Missouri).
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Boris & Klein, supra note 278, at 208–09.
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Howes et al., supra note 279, at 74.
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Boris & Klein, supra note 278, at 5.

294 Nancy Folbre, Candace Howes & Carrie Leana, A Care Policy and Research Agenda, in For Love and
Money, supra note 277, at 197–98.
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In Harris v. Quinn,298 the Supreme Court further halted this movement’s progress.
B. Background of the Case
In 2003 Illinois passed a law declaring that personal assistants were public employees
of the state for the purposes of coverage under the state’s Public Labor Relations Act
(“PLRA”).299 This meant that personal assistants could collectively bargain for better
working conditions. Personal assistants are funded by the federal Medicaid program to
provide in-home caretaking services to “customers” (i.e., individuals with disabilities)
whose conditions would otherwise require institutionalization.300 The purpose of the law
was to designate a single union as the representative of personal assistants for collective
bargaining purposes.301 Under the resulting collective bargaining agreement, all personal
assistants who were not union members were required to pay a “fair share” of union dues.302
Pamela Harris and several other personal assistants, represented by the anti-union group
the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, sued the state and the union arguing
that the PLRA violates their First Amendment rights by requiring them to pay a fee to a
union that they do not support.303 Illinois prevailed before the district court and the Seventh
Circuit.304 Before the Supreme Court, a 5-4 majority ruled against the state, striking down
the fee requirement as violating the First Amendment’s free association rights.
C. The Majority Opinion
In the decision striking down the union fee requirement, Justice Alito distinguished
prior Court precedent holding that a state can require all its employees to pay union dues305
298

Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).

299

Id. at 2626.

300

Id. at 2624.

301

Id. at 2626 (citing 2003 Ill. Laws 1930).

302

Id. at 2626.

303

Harris v. Quinn, 2010 WL 4736500 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2010).

304

Id.; Harris v. Quinn, 656 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2011).

305 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. at 2630–38. The case is Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
Prior Court precedent had already established that fees paid by non-union members cannot go toward lobbying
or political activity. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991) and cases cited therein.
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in order to prevent “non-members from free-riding on the union’s efforts” and to promote
labor harmony by giving the state a single party with whom to negotiate.306 Justice Alito
contended that these principles did not apply to the Illinois personal assistants because
they were not “full-fledged” public sector employees, but rather, only “partial-public”
employees.307 In so doing, he created a new “separate-but-unequal” category in the Court’s
labor jurisprudence.308 Justice Alito reasoned that the personal assistants worked directly
for “customers” who retained the authority to hire, supervise, and fire them.
Having distinguished controlling precedent, Justice Alito concluded that the
impingement on the dissenters’ First Amendment rights, i.e., the right not to support a
union, was not outweighed by any compelling state interest.309 Any asserted interest in
labor peace was illusory given that personal assistants spend their time in private homes
and thus presumably could not organize effectively enough to disrupt state operations.310
Moreover, the unions could advocate for improvements in the welfare of personal
assistants even without the union dues provision.311 As explained below, the decision and
its characterization of care workers rested on gender stereotypes, inaccurate conceptions of
the care work market, and class-based discrimination against low-wage workers.
D. The Court’s Market Assumptions
The Harris decision, one of several in recent years to weaken unions,312 devalues
care work, and in so doing, undermines the quality of life for both care workers and care
306

Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2627.

307

Id. at 2638.

308 See Kathleen Geier, Sarah Jaffe & Sheila Bapat, What Do The Recent Supreme Court Decisions Mean
for Women’s Economic Security, Nation: Curve Blog (July 17, 2014) (comments of Kathleen Geier), http://
www.thenation.com/blog/180685/what-do-recent-supreme-court-decisions-mean-womens-economic-security
[https://perma.cc/SWM7-8TC8].
309 Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2639–40. For a critique of the Court’s First Amendment analysis and its failure
to acknowledge the First Amendment rights of unions and union members, see generally Catherine L. Fisk &
Margaux Poueymirou, Harris v. Quinn and the Contradictions of Compelled Speech, 48 Loyola L.A. L. Rev.
439 (2015).
310

Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2640.

311

Id. at 2641.

312 See Gilman, supra note 12, 418–20 (discussing Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct.
2277 (2012)). But see infra note 366 and accompanying text.
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recipients—both of whom are disproportionately female.313 Women live longer than
men and are more likely to need care. At the same time, women dominate the paid care
workforce due to gendered norms of altruism, discrimination in the job market, and social
expectations.314 The Harris Court’s anachronistic assumptions about the value of low-wage
workers and women’s work coalesce to reinforce the invisibility of care workers.
The Harris decision clings to this private-public binary, even though care workers
straddle the boundaries by working in the home. Women have long provided care to
children, the disabled, and the elderly for no pay, based on the belief and social norm that
women should provide care out of love.315 As a result, care work is typically not considered
“real” work,316 as assuming altruism “reduces the need to worry about disparate human
capital investments made within the family.”317 Yet the economic contribution made by
unpaid care workers is massive and estimated at between $354 and $450 billion per year.318
Of course, our economic system neither measures nor credits unpaid care work within
the family.319 The results of women’s traditional care-taking role have been economic
dependence on men and a persistent labor market disadvantage.320 Further, in taking time
off to care for family members, women workers suffer a “care penalty” in lost wages and
less professional advancement.321 Nevertheless, the majority’s core economic assumption
here is that low care prices reflect an efficient market.
By contrast, the dissenters understood why personal assistants qualify as public
employees, falling comfortably within prior precedent. Among other things, the state
313

Folbre et al., supra note 294, at 187.

314 Paula England, Nancy Folbre & Carrie Leana, Motivating Care, in For Love and Money, supra note
277, at 21, 36; England & Folbre, supra note 117, at 62.
315 Bapat, supra note 283, at 18; England & Folbre, supra note 117, at 74–75 (“The Western intellectual
tradition has traditionally assumed that women naturally provide care for others, especially dependents.”).
316

Nelson, supra note 86, at 62 (explaining how orthodox neoclassical economics excludes caring).

317

Silbaugh, supra note 120, at 338, 346.

318

Folbre, supra note 280, at 92, 103.

319 Nancy Folbre, Introduction, in For Love and Money, supra note 277, at xi; Chuang, supra note 279, at
1634 (“Labeling housework as ‘care’ signals that work in the home is divorced from economic entitlements.”).
320

England & Folbre, supra note 117, at 61.

321 Suzanne Bianchi, Nancy Folbre & Douglas Wolf, Unpaid Care Work, in For Love and Money, supra
note 277, at 40, 58–59.
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sets the terms of employment for the personal assistant workforce, determines and pays
their wages and benefits, establishes the job’s basic qualifications, describes the services
a personal assistant may provide, and prescribes the terms of the employment contracts
entered into between personal assistants and customers.322 At the same time, customers
have the authority to manage their own day-to-day relationships with caregivers. Personal
assistants thus have two employers, each of whom controls certain aspects of their work.
Unlike the majority, which squeezed care workers into the private side of the work divide,
the dissent was attuned to the triangular relationship between care workers, their customers,
and the state that arises due to the personalized nature of the service provided and the
requirements that attach to a government-funded program.323 One commentator pointed out
the irony that plaintiff Pamela Harris cared for her disabled son, making him his mother’s
boss in the Court’s cramped reading of the employment relationship.324
In recognizing the permeability between public and private, Justice Kagan’s dissent,
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor,325 reflected feminist understandings
of the home and the workplace. Feminists have long attacked the artificial boundaries
between public and private that legal systems and social norms historically upheld.326 In
the traditional view, the public domain was the world of markets and politics, where men

322

Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2646–47 (2014).

323

Folbre et al., supra note 294, at 187.

324 Sarah Jaffe, SCOTUS’ Real, Demented Agenda: Why Harris and Hobby Lobby Spell Disaster for
Working Women, Salon (July 1, 2014), http://www.salon.com/2014/07/01/scotus_real_demented_agenda_
why_harris_and_hobby_lobby_spell_disaster_for_working_women/ [https://perma.cc/7QMN-4R8Y]. She
adds: “One would not assume that the patient in a hospital is the ultimate employer of the nurse who cares
for them, but in this case, it seems, the patient is assumed to be the boss.” Id. In Long Island Care at Home,
Ltd. v. Coke, the Court upheld a regulation providing that home health care workers who work for third-party
employers and who provide “companionship services” to the elderly were exempt from the wage and hour
protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act. In so doing, the Court favored the interests of consumers of care
over the providers of care, even though consumers benefit from a skilled, fairly paid workforce. Long Island
Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007); see Peggie R. Smith, Who Will Care for the Elderly? The
Future of Home Care, 61 Buff. L. Rev. 323, 331–37 (2013). The Department of Labor under President Obama
passed a regulation to overturn this narrow interpretation of FLSA, 78 Fed. Reg. 60,557, and the D.C. Circuit
upheld the regulation against challenge, Home Care Ass’n of America v. Weil, 799 F.3d 1084 (D.C. Cir. 2015),
cert. denied 2016 WL 3461581 (2016).
325

Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2644.

326 See Tracy E. Higgins, Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing, 75 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 847, 847 (2000).
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dominated and women were excluded.327 By contrast, the private domain consisted of home
and family.328 Yet as feminists pointed out, privacy within families left men free to dominate,
and even abuse, women and children because of their dependence on men for social goods
and a lack of state intervention into the private realm.329 Feminists recognized that state
inaction in the private realm is not neutral, because the state sets the legal ground rules that
permit private inequality to flourish unchecked.330 Furthermore, feminists contended that
the idea of private autonomy within the home was a myth for women, who are enmeshed
in family relationships.331
Paid care work, such as that performed by the personal assistants in Harris, is
motivated by both emotional connection and money.332 It does not fit into tidy market-based
assumptions about self-interest. As feminist economists have noted, care is an “activity
that conspicuously violates the standard assumptions made regarding the motivation of
‘rational economic man’—dispassionate pursuit of narrow self-interest.”333 Regardless
of motivation, “whether performed by a family member or by an employee, [care work]
supports and subsidizes all other productive work.”334 The Harris court does not see the
contributions to capital made by care workers, instead pushing them deeper into the privacy
of the home where, as tradition dictates, they remain isolated.335 In other words, the Harris
court resurrects a public–private divide that limits women’s economic independence and
traps some women in poverty.
327 See Suzanne A. Kim, Reconstructing Family Privacy, 57 Hastings L.J. 557, 568–69 (2006) (summarizing
the public-private dichotomy).
328

Id. at 568–69.

329 See Higgins, supra note 326, at 850–51; Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative
and Privacy, 105 Yale L.J. 2117, 2118 (1996); see also Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the
Family 128–29 (1989).
330 See Frances Olson, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 Harv. L. Rev.
1497, 1502, 1506 (1983); Okin, supra note 329, at 111.
331
See generally Martha Fineman, The Neutered Mother, The Sexual Family, and Other
Twentieth Century Tragedies 186–89 (1995); Robin West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives:
A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 15 Wis. Women’s L.J. 149, 151–52 (1987); Robin
West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1988).
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E. Devaluation of Care Workers
The Court’s opinion also reflects long-held biases against domestic workers.336 As
Gloria Steinem has written, “categories of work are less likely to be paid by the expertise
they require—or even by the importance to the community or to the mythical free market—
than by the sex, race and class of most of their workers.”337 This is evident when comparing
the wages paid to men and women for performing the same work. Moreover, care workers
carry the stigma of handling intimate and “dirty” tasks related to bodily processes.338
The diminished valuation of care work stretches back to slavery, when Black women
performed unpaid domestic work while working under conditions of extreme cruelty.339
The “profession” of home care arose during the New Deal as government funding was
made available to help families dealing with illness and old age; the providers of this care
were mostly African American women who had previously worked in domestic service.340
In other words, the undeserving poor—single mothers of color—were funneled to care for
the deserving poor—children, the elderly, and the disabled.341
At the same time, the New Deal codified prejudices against working women and people
of color. Congress specifically excluded domestic workers, along with agricultural workers,
from labor protections in the Fair Labor Standards Act, the National Labor Relations
Act, and the Social Security Act.342 Most historians contend that these exclusions, which
primarily impacted Black workers and women, were necessary in order to gain support
from Southern congressmen, whose state economies were built on the backs of cheap labor
provided by Black workers.343 While the Social Security Act has since been amended to
include domestic workers,344 these workers remain outside the purview of the National
336

Boris & Klein, supra note 278, at 8; Bapat, supra note 283, at 20 (citing Gloria Steinem).

337 Gloria Steinem, ‘Valuing Women’s Work,’ Moyers & Company (Mar. 30, 2012), http://billmoyers.com/
content/valuing-womens-work/ [https://perma.cc/3J8H-LBV6].
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Boris & Klein, supra note 278, at 8.

339

Bapat, supra note 283, at 21.
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Id. at 11.
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Id. at 12.
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See id. at 52–61 (describing statutory history).
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Id. at 55.

344 Social Security was amended to cover domestic workers in 1950 (if certain earning thresholds and days
of work for a single employer were met) and again in 1954 (eliminating the days worked for a single employer
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Labor Relations Act, which provides employees with the rights to organize and collectively
bargain to improve the conditions of employment.345 In 2014, the Obama Administration
finally included most domestic workers within the scope of the FLSA’s overtime and
minimum wage protections, and the D.C. Circuit upheld the regulation against a challenge
by the home health care industry.346 A different administration could repeal the rule.
Moreover, domestic workers are outside the purview of federal employment
discrimination statutes, which generally apply only to larger employers of a defined size,
and since many care workers work for small employers or are considered independent
contractors, they remain uncovered.347 Further, there is a large “grey” market in which
under-the-table work arrangements leave many care workers without legal protection.348
In sum, the current low status of care workers results from a history of “racialized labor
markets, the location of care as welfare services, and the political and legal structures
that sustain low wages and inhibit quality access.”349 These gaps are the reason that
Illinois stepped in to protect personal assistants. Yet Harris overturns the decision of a
democratically accountable branch that sought to correct for market imperfections and laws
that undervalued care work. The Court substituted its own inaccurate market assumptions
about what is best for consumers, i.e., low prices. In so doing, the Court reflects and
reinforces biases about and against domestic workers.

requirement). Thus, most domestic workers are now covered. 42 U.S.C. §410(j)(3).
345 The NLRA does not include any individual employed “in the domestic service of any family or person
at his home.” 29 U.S.C. §152(3).
346

See supra note 324 and citations therein.

347 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e (West 2016) (covered employers are defined
as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working
day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks” in the year); Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §2611
(West 2016) (provides for up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave for health conditions or to care for a new child,
but does not cover employers with fewer than forty employees); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§12111(5)(a) (West 2016) (prohibits employers from discriminating against disabled employees, but it applies
only to employers who have “15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year”); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §630(b)
(West 2016) (protects employees over forty years old, but covers only employers who have “twenty or more
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year.”).
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F. Impact
Domestic workers are not the only losers in this decision. The Harris decision harms
customers and the state as well. As the dissent pointed out, in-home care programs were
long plagued by workforce shortages and high turnover, due to low wages and a lack of
benefits.350 In turn, this labor instability lowered the quality of care and pushed the disabled
into more expensive institutions.351 These are systemic problems far beyond the ability of
any individual customer or worker to solve; rather, the state is the single employer with
the ability to negotiate with a union representative to attack these problems. The state’s
involvement improves the functioning of the home health care market.
Moreover, there is empirical evidence that collective bargaining works for domestic
workers. With the benefits of collective bargaining, home care assistants in Illinois “doubled
their wages in less than 10 years, obtained state-funded health insurance, and benefitted from
better training and workplace safety measures.”352 At the same time, customers received
better care, and the state got a more stable workforce and saved money.353 The irony of
the majority decision, as the dissent pointed out, is that it “penalizes the State for giving
disabled persons some control over their own care.”354 Harris represents an endorsement
of individual rights over collective action. Like Hobby Lobby, it rules that health care is an
individual responsibility rather than a social one, despite the reality of our interconnected
relationships.355
So, if customers, personal assistants, and the state are all harmed by the Harris
decision, who benefits? One beneficiary is the home health care industry, which is largely
for-profit. The industry is one of the top five growing franchises in the country, with the
top franchises grossing over $1 million annually with gross margins of 30–40%.356 Profits
350
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grew 9% a year from 2001 to 2009.357 A major study of Medicare-funded home health
care found that for-profit agencies deliver lower-quality care even though operating costs
were 18% higher, and thus, the authors questioned whether for-profit agencies should be
allowed to remain eligible for Medicare reimbursements.358 A 2009 study by the National
Private Duty Association found that businesses charge clients twice as much as they pay
employees, prompting an employee advocate to comment that the industry simply does not
have the overhead to justify such low wages.359 If the Harris majority was so concerned
with rising state costs—notably, it cited to a report entitled the The Trouble with Public
Sector Unions360—it might consider other sources for cost savings than the pockets of
domestic workers.
The other winner in this fight is the anti-union, “right to work” movement, which is
funded by conservatives such as the Koch brothers, and which spends millions to lobby
state and federal governments and to bring litigation to limit union power.361 Their policy
positions benefit big business at the expense of workers and consumers.362 In the end, lowpaid workers are pitted against vulnerable care recipients while private industry cashes
its checks. Of course, customers with means can opt out of this publicly-funded market
into a private one, which offers greater quality, choice, and control.363 The middle-class is
particularly squeezed, as they have fewer employer benefits and earn too much for meansperma.cc/75JQ-NRJM].
357 See Amy Traub, Hard Work Doesn’t Pay for Home-Care Workers, Am. Prospect (Mar. 22, 2012), http://
prospect.org/article/hard-work-doesnt-pay-home-care-workers [https://perma.cc/GLR5-TJ57].
358 William Cabin et al., For-Profit Medicare Home Health Agencies’ Costs Appear Higher and Quality
Appears Lower Compared to Nonprofit Agencies, 33 Health Affairs 1460, 1460–65 (2014), http://content.
healthaffairs.org/content/33/8/1460.abstract [https://perma.cc/TSY9-6W35].
359
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Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2632 n.7 (2014).

361 See Jay Riestenberg & Mary Bottari, Who Is Behind the National Right to Work Committee and its
Anti-Union Crusade?, PR Watch (June 3, 2014), http://www.prwatch.org/news/2014/06/12498/who-behindnational-right-work-committee-and-its-anti-union-crusade [https://perma.cc/VU5R-X6T6] (noting that the
National Right to Work Committee spent over $33 million on lobbying between 1999 and 2013).
362 Ed Pilkington, Wisconsin Anti-union Bill is ‘Word for Word’ From Rightwing Lobbyist Group, Guardian
(Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/feb/23/wisconsin-right-to-work-bill-scott-walkeralec [https://perma.cc/BJY5-RGEL] (a right to work bill passed in Wisconsin in 2015 was taken verbatim from
a model bill framed by a pro-business lobbying group called ALEC).
363 Janet Gornick et al., The Disparate Impacts of Care Policy, in For Love & Money, supra note 277, at
141, 178.
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tested programs such as Medicaid.364 These income disparities splinter women by class and
lessen opportunities for alliances.
The most direct impact of Harris is that the 20,000 personal assistants in Illinois may
lose employment protections if the union, losing fees from non-members, cannot afford
to negotiate effectively on their behalf. As a practical matter, it will be very difficult for
the union to gather voluntary dues now that it has to go door-to-door to each individual
workplace.365 Harris also portends a tough road for unions in other Supreme Court
challenges, as the Court indicated a strong desire to overrule existing precedent altogether.
Unions scored a reprieve, perhaps temporary, when a 4-4 Court in Friedrichs v. California
Teachers Association split on the constitutionality of agency fees for public employee
unions, thus leaving the Ninth Circuit’s decision upholding agency fees intact.366 Lowwage workers are especially vulnerable to attacks on workers’ rights, but their losses often
spread to the larger workplace.367
In addition, Harris stalls the momentum of today’s most vibrant pro-worker movement.
As a result, it is more important than ever for domestic workers to organize outside the
formal union structures. For instance, in New York, a multi-ethnic and multicultural array
of groups of domestic workers and their supporters, including care work employers,
advocated for enactment of the New York Domestic Worker Bill of Rights in 2010—the
first in the nation—which guarantees overtime, paid rest days, and meal and rest breaks
for domestic workers.368 Similar laws have passed in California and Hawaii, and activists
have been building momentum in other states as well.369 Sheila Bapat writes about similar
alt-labor movement strategies, such as worker centers and online organizing that operate
outside the formal labor framework and thus might have greater chances for sustainable
success.370
364
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V. Reflections and Remedies
The core insights of feminist economics are borne out in the Supreme Court decisions
impacting working class women and their families. To begin with, the Court devalues
care work and reinforces gendered stereotypes about women’s role in the home and
market. Harris treats care workers as less valuable than other workers; Wal-Mart permits
employers to make gendered assumptions about the career trajectories of workers based
on women’s care responsibilities; and Hobby Lobby limits the ability of women workers
to make decisions about their family size, and thus, to control their care obligations. These
decisions tell women that they should engage in care work for no pay or low pay, that
women’s care obligations are fair grounds for limiting professional opportunities, and
that women—not society—are individually responsible for caring for dependent family
members.
Moreover, these Court decisions prioritize corporate conceptions of efficiency over
human well-being or other ethical values, even though there is nothing “intrinsic in the
economic or legal structure of commerce that forces firms, inexorably, as if run on rails,
to neglect values of care and concern in order to strive for every last dollar of profits.”371
The Wal-Mart decision entrenches subjective personnel practices that harm women while
insulating management; Hobby Lobby elevates the religious preferences of a handful of
capital owners over the health needs and religious preferences of thousands of female
employees; and Harris hands anti-union forces a win in lieu of improving the quality of
care for the ill or the conditions for workers. These decisions evidence no concern with the
quality of life for female workers or their families.
In addition, the Court fails to acknowledge or understand the day-to-day reality
of women’s lives at the intersection of class, race, and gender. For the most part, real
women are absent from these Court decisions, unless they are spoken of disparagingly.372
Meanwhile, corporations are imbued with sympathetic human characteristics. The Court
majority suggests that no rational Wal-Mart manager would ever discriminate and that
371
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372 For instance, the Wal-Mart majority goes out of its way to impugn the credibility of the three
named plaintiffs, two of whom were Black, by describing their alleged wrongdoing as employees—
facts which are irrelevant to a class certification decision. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131
S. Ct. 2541, 2547–48 (2011). Judicial attacks on the credibility of female litigants are common.
See Leigh Goodmark, Telling Stories, Saving Lives: The Battered Mothers’ Testimony Project,
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Hobby Lobby’s owners are a tight-knit family who built their business from scratch. By
contrast, the dissents’ authors are both women who show empathy and understanding of the
social and legal barriers facing women in the low-wage workforce and how those barriers
are compounded by class.
Finally, in each case, the Court strikes down collective action to uphold the status quo.
Wal-Mart rejected the class action litigation brought by female employees; Hobby Lobby
overturned a legislative consensus to provide women with contraception; and Harris
similarly overturned a hard-fought law to permit collective bargaining by care workers. The
conservative Court majority claims to be scornful of judicial activism,373 but eagerly strikes
down legislatively-enacted worker protections in order to preserve corporate prerogatives.
The Court’s attack on collective action to better the lives of women is perhaps the most
disturbing pattern in these cases.
These decisions reinforce gender-based economic inequality. The subjective
employment practices that depress women’s wages (Wal-Mart), the loss of contraceptive
options that limit women’s economic mobility (Hobby Lobby), and the low wages that occur
without collective bargaining (Harris) are all factors that contribute to the gender wage
gap, women’s poverty, lower workforce participation rates for women, and a permanent
class of low-wage workers with limited opportunities for advancement. None of the cases
have outcomes that will advance women’s economic mobility.
Where do we go from here? These cases—each of which was decided on a narrow 5-4
vote—demonstrate the importance of Supreme Court nominees and in turn, the importance
of presidential election outcomes. The recent death of Justice Scalia has highlighted the
significance of a single vote on a closely divided Court and how his replacement could affect
the balance of decision-making for decades.374 Given that the president nominates justices,
373 See Sheldon Whitehouse, Conservative Judicial Activism: The Politicization of the Supreme Court
Under Chief Justice Roberts, 9 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 195, 196 (2015) (describing Justice Roberts during his
confirmation hearings claiming that he would be an “umpire” who would call “balls and strikes”) (internal
quotations omitted). Cf. Keith E. Whittington, The Least Activist Supreme Court in History? The Roberts Court
and the Exercise of Judicial Review, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2219, 2220 (2014) (“The Court in recent years has
struck down federal laws in fewer cases than has its predecessors.”); Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Is the
Roberts Court Especially Activist? A Study of Invalidating (and Upholding) Federal, State, and Local Laws,
61 Emory L.J. 737, 737–38 (2012) (concluding that “liberal Justices tend to invalidate conservative laws and
conservative Justices, liberal laws”).
374 Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html [https://perma.cc/PUC2-DDGE].
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it is clear that presidential elections matter for women’s equality.375 Thus, feminists must
play a role in explaining the link between women’s work and the economy and supporting
candidates who understand that connection.376
That is just a beginning. In a prior article about economic inequality, I detailed
several strategies for the economic justice lawyering movement,377 all of which would
contribute to the economic security of women. To begin with, progressive lawyers need to
continue developing theoretical and doctrinal frameworks centered on economic fairness,
recognizing that both the Court’s composition and its views are fluid. Along these lines,
we need to engage with other disciplines to build a social science record that reveals the
connections between law, policy, and economic hardship. Accordingly, feminist legal
and economic theorists should work together to continue developing theories and data
that counter prevailing market narratives and explain the basis of social responsibility for
vulnerability. Due to the Occupy Wall Street movement, workers’ rights organizing, and
the increasing acknowledgment of economic inequality by policy makers, presidential
candidates, and corporate titans alike, Americans are becoming increasingly aware of
economic inequality and more likely to acknowledge structural, as opposed to individual,
barriers to equality. Thus, the time is right to explain how the state shapes markets and how
public policies can improve market outcomes for workers.
In addition, progressive lawyers must align with workers’ rights and identity-based
movements, such as those focused on race and gender, to build a broad-based, intersectional
economic justice movement based on shared interests. The successes of the domestic
worker rights movement (Harris v. Quinn notwithstanding), within and outside of formal
labor structures, demonstrate that effective organizing can lead to better laws. Recently,
in some jurisdictions, low-wage workers have successfully advocated for paid sick leave,
higher minimum wages, and fair scheduling practices. At the same time, government is
not the answer to all of the market’s deficiencies. Worker movements are having some
success in pressuring employers directly to make changes. For instance, activism by fastfood and retail workers has led some employers, such as McDonald’s, to pay wages above
375 See Adam Liptak, How a Vacancy on the Supreme Court Affects Cases in the 2015-16 Term, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 15, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/02/14/us/politics/how-scalias-death-could-affectmajor-supreme-court-cases-in-the-2016-term.html [https://perma.cc/ZH9H-9YEQ].
376 For a review of the gender politics in the 2012 presidential election, including how feminists fought a
Republican assault on women’s rights and how President Obama connected economic and gender issues, see
Michele Estrin Gilman, Feminism, Democracy, and the “War on Women,” 32 J.L. & Inequal. 1, 11–12 (2014).
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the legally-required minimum (although still not a living wage).378 Given that women
are disproportionately represented in the service industry and low-wage workforce, this
movement has the potential to decrease inequality. Workers are also exploring alternative
legal structures, such as worker cooperatives, to become their own managers and owners
and create workplaces that value their needs.379 The ability to “democratize the workplace”
through “allocation of governance and profit-sharing rights” is “the most empowering in
terms of control over one’s working environment.”380
Lawyers can help grassroots movements for economic justice by educating workers
about legal rights, providing assistance in strategizing and organizing, drafting proposed
bills and legal documents, and thinking creatively with grassroots advocates about how to
adapt existing legal structures to benefit workers and women.381 In general, lawyers and their
clients have a large toolbox to effectuate systemic change, including litigation, community
organizing, legislative and administrative advocacy, civil disobedience, public education,
and community education. For instance, E. Tammy Kim describes a model of community
lawyering for low-wage workers in which lawyers “support community organizing
through legal representation of members of external grassroots organizations.”382 The
lawyers provide “legal assistance to resolve discrete legal problems and attack structural
injustices,” while the workers and organizers identify the spaces where law can improve
378 Melanie Hicken, McDonald’s is Giving 90,000 Workers a Pay Raise, CNN Monday (Apr. 2, 2015),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/01/news/companies/mcdonalds-pay-raise/ [https://perma.cc/4893-AV6K]. It is
also possible that these employers are trying to head off more drastic government action and/or worker unrest
with modest raises.
379 See Ariana R. Levinson, Founding Worker Cooperatives: Social Movement Theory and the Law, 14 Nev.
L.J. 322 (2014); Carmen Huertas-Noble, Promoting Worker-Owned Cooperatives as a CED Empowerment
Strategy: A Case Study of Colors and Lawyering in Support of Participatory Decision-Making and Meaningful
Social Change, 17 Clin. L. Rev. 255 (2010). Huertas-Noble describes a variety of community lawyering
models. Id. at 257–61.
380
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381 For instance, Huertas-Noble describes all the tasks lawyers perform in creating worker cooperatives,
including researching legal models, counseling clients, forming legal entities, structuring entity relationships,
drafting employment contracts, negotiating with lenders and investors, drafting loan documents, and the like.
Id. at 273–74.
382 E. Tammy Kim, Lawyers as Resource Allies in Workers’ Struggles for Social Change, 13 N.Y. City L.
Rev. 213, 220 (2009). Kim helpfully explains various models of lawyering for workers’ rights and summarizes
the rich literature on community lawyering models. Id. at 218–21, 225. See also Loretta Price & Melinda
Davis, Seeds of Change: A Bibliographic Introduction to Law and Organizing, 26 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc.
Change 615 (2000–2001).
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workers’ status.383 Relatedly, Sebastian Amar and Guy Johnson describe a model in which
lawyers are paired with community organizers to serve immigrant communities.384 After
immigrant care workers identify their legal needs, the lawyers document and formalize
their grievances, negotiate with employers, and file suit where necessary.385 These and other
community lawyering models provide insights and valuable lessons for lawyers working
for workers’ rights.
Finally, we need to expand access to justice to ensure that the judicial system is
responsive to the 99%. While this Article focuses on the Supreme Court, most Americans
have contact with the judicial branch through lower-level courts and administrative
agencies when they owe a debt, are part of a dissolving family, or are charged with
committing a crime. Civil and criminal access to lawyers is limited, which denies people
an effective voice and compounds economic inequality. Expanding access to justice is
essential for achieving justice. In sum, there are multiple strategies for combating genderbased economic equality; the fight will be multidimensional, collaborative, and long-term.
Understanding the Supreme Court’s assumptions and reasoning with regard to women
workers is a preliminary step in creating change.
CONCLUSION
Economic inequality is on the rise, with the harshest impacts falling on women and
minorities. A key insight into understanding wealth and income disparities is that they
are not the inevitable result of a competitive market. To the contrary, government creates
the rules of the market. The Supreme Court is one of the players. In recent years, the
Court has issued a series of decisions that harm women workers and their families while
preserving corporate prerogatives. In these cases, the Court uncritically accepts simplified
assumptions of neoclassical economics and reinforces gendered stereotypes about
women’s work inside and outside the home. The Court devalues care work, promotes its
view of efficiency over other values, upholds severe power imbalances in the workplace,
and ignores the intersectional realities of the lives of low-wage women workers. Women
workers are not passive; they have courageously organized to remove barriers to economic
parity. However, the Court has stricken down a range of collective action on the part of
women workers to obtain the same pay and opportunities as men (Wal-Mart); to have
383
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access to contraception and thereby control the size and timing of their families (Hobby
Lobby Stores); and to collectively bargain for better working conditions (Harris). In the
face of the Court’s erosion of collective action, any social movement for economic equality
must grapple with the judiciary’s role in upholding unjust market outcomes and strategize
around opportunities for reform. We currently have a Court for the 1%. We must advocate
for a Court for all.

